Study of English

November 1, 2009

Whaling:the message form animals

Filed under: Japan,U.S.A.,Whale — Sei-no-Syounagon @ 2:58 pm
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Vide “Whaling:the message form animals”

May 14, 2009

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 6-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 6-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 5-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 5-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 4-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 4-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 3-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 3-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 2-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 2-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 1-6

“Rape of Nanking” documentary film 1-6

May 11, 2009

WAR DAMAGE IN THE NANKING AREA December, 1937 to March, 1938 By Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe

December, 1937 to March, 1938

By Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe
Professor of Sociology, University of Nanking


This book was written on the result of the only scientific research by an (anti-Japan) American scholar concerning so-called “Nanking Massacre”.
 Chinese who criticizes Japan for so-called “Nanking Massacre” and the sympathizer disregard the conclusion of this book.
 If you read this book, You understand the reason.
I do not think that the contents of the book is accurate. Dr. Smythe, professor of the Nanjing university is complete Chinese favor.  However, it must be truer than “Nanjing massacre” that Chinese says.

 Photographic images→



December, 1937 to March, 1938
Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe{Professor of Sociology, University of Nanking}AND ASSISTANTS
On Behalf of


IN the course of its efforts to aid the impoverished and troubled people of Nanking and adjacent districts, the Nanking International Relief committee early felt the necessity of discovering with reasonable accuracy their true economic position. What were both the extent and the nature of their losses? How far impaired are their opportunities and abilities for making a living? What supplies of food may he expected from the farms of this area? What are the fundamental deficiencies or obstacles that stand in the way of normal economic effort on the farms and in the city? Such questions were basic to any sound consideration of policy and methods in relief. The only good way to answer them was to go out to seek the facts. The Nanking International Relief committee here makes known the results of its inquiries primarily for the information of those concerned with the practice and the support of relief work in this and other areas; secondarily, for the wider public which is or should be concerned with the ravages of warfare among civilians, in whatever country. Our own position is humanitarian, without regard to the nationality of war victims. In this report we seldom use the terms “Chinese” and “Japanese”, and consider persons dimply as farmers, housewives or children. The International Committee is aware, however, that statements have been published by Chinese, putting upon the Japanese an exclusive and exaggerated blame for the injuries to the people of the Nanking area; likewise that statements have been published by Japanese, Charging the Chinese with burning and looting which they themselves benevolently checked. In order to guard against controversial misuse of the present report, we feel it necessary to make a brief factual statement as to the causation of the injuries listed. . The burning in the municipal areas immediately adjoining the walled city of Nanking, and in some of the towns and villages along the southeasterly approaches to Nanking, was done by the Chinese armies as a military measure―whether proper or improper, is not for us to determine. A very small amount of damage to civilian life and property was done by military operations along the roads from the southeast, and in the four days of moderately severe attack upon the city. Practically all of the burning within the city walls’ and a good deal of that in rural areas, was done gradually by the Japanese forces (in Nanking, from December 19, one Week after entry’ to the beginning


of February). For the period covered in the surveys, most of the looking in the entire area, and practically all of the violence against civilians, was also done by the Japanese forces―whether justifiably or unjustifiably in terms of policy, is not for us to decide. Beginning early in January, there gradually developed looting and robbery by Chinese civilians; and later, particularly after March, the struggle for fuel brought serious structural damage to unoccupied buildings. Also, there has latterly grown up in the rural areas a serious banditry which currently rivals and sometimes surpasses the robbery and violence by Japanese soldiers. In some portions of our report, these elements of causation can be distinguished. From a humanitarian point of view, we venture merely to point out that. losses to life and property from actual warfare are shown by these surveys to be one or two per cent of the total. The rest could hare been prevented if both sides had wished to give sufficient consideration to the welfare of civilians, including reasonable protection by military and civilian police.The International committee which authorised these surveys had within its membership a trained sociologist, Dr. Lewis S. C. Smythe Professor of Sociology at the University of Nanking, Who not only had general experience in survey methods, but also had taken a responsible part in two earlier surveys of calamities in this region. These inquiries were: the Economic Survey made on behalf of the National Flood Relief Commission by the Department of Agricultural Economics of the College of Agriculture and Forestry of the University of Nanking (report published by Professor J. Lossing Buck. Director, under the title ”The 1931 Flood in China”); and the Survey of the Rural Areas Affected by the Shanghai Hostilities (1932), made at the request of the Minister of Finance by the same Department of Agricultural Economics (unpublished). Both these surveys were for the purpose of ascertaining actual needs as against vague or tendencious reports from Local officials. The accomplishment of the present surveys is largely dependent upon the unusual abilities and energies of Dr. Smythe, event though he has not been able to give full time to them while acting both as Treasurer and as Secretary of the International Committee. Full acknowledgment is due to the surveys mentioned above, which were drawn upon both for points of method and for check or comparison of results. Likewise to the vast survey recently completed under Professor Buck’s direction, and reported in his book, Land Utilization in China, with supplementary Atlas and volume of Statistics.


FORWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Ⅰ. CITY SURVEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1. Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Deaths and Injuries due to Hostilities . . . . . . . . . . 7
3. Employment and Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Losses of Families Remaining in Nanking . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Total Losses of Building and Contents  . . . . . . . . . . 12
Ⅱ. AGRICULTURAL SURVEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Farm Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2. Winter Crops and Spring Seed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3. The war and Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4. Effects of War: Farm and City Compared . . . . . . . . . . 23
PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
A. Further Notes on Organization and Method . . . . . . . . 28
B. Migration of Whole Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
C. Schedules Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
V. TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1. Nanking
2. Ningshu Area

List of Tables



The International Committee’s Surveys were really two, though each of them was compound. The City Survey was essentially an inquiry among families resident in Nanking. supplemented by an investigation of all buildings unoccupied as well as occupied, and separating for special attention as food-producers the market gardeners who are scattered through three or four sections of the city. The Agricultural Survey was essentially an inquiry among resident farm families, supplemented by a village survey described in Appendix B, and by the listing of significant prices in market towns.
1. FIELD PROCDURE. The family investigators in the City Survey in Nanking were instructed to fill outa family out a family schedule for every family in every 50th inhabited house. A ”House” was defined as a “house number” eyen though in some instances there were several apartments or buildings at one number. In March many entrances were barred, And there was Some little difficulty in determining which house were inhabited. Consequently, some may have been passed over. A control map served to check areas skipped. Each man was assigned a specified section on the map to cover and to record the count of house numbers in selecting his 50th inhabited house. The investigators were well received because of the favorable reputation of the Committee but were careful to explain that they came only to inquire about facts and not as the family relief investigators working in the regular service of the Committee. Men who participated in both activities thought very definitely that the Family Survey was much less subject to exaggeration of losses than the relief investigations.
The building investigators in the City Survey had two tasks: (1) to count every building in the city and indicate whether it had been damaged by military operations, fire or looting; and (2) to make an estimate of the loss on every 10th building. For the purpose a house number was considered a “building”, though in some cases it included more than one structure. A well-trained construction engineer worked out unit-cost figures for each of the common types of construction, which greatly facilitated the accuracy of these estimates. Furthermore, of each pair of investigators, one was a contractor. Estimates on loss of contents in uninhabited buildings had to be based on the nature of the building and inquiries from neighbors. A control map located areas overlooked and these were carefully re-done.


*This “Introduction” is written to inform general readers as to how the surveys were conducted. Those interested in technical considerations are referred to Appendix A, “Further Notes on Organization and Method.”

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Both the family and building investigations covered the whole of the city inside the walls and the areas just outside some of the gates as well. But they did not take in all that formerly comprised the Nanking Municipality, which included Pukow and number of surrounding small towns. Only certain small areas and scattered individual houses inhabited by the Japanese military or civilians could not be studied.
In the Agricultural Survey two investigators were sent out across each of the six hsien armed with passes from three organizations. They were instructed to follow a main road one way and then to return zigzagging across the main road in the form of a figure eight in order to cover the areas back from the main roads. On this circuit they were to secure a village schedule from every third village on their route and in that village fill out one farm schedule for every tenth farm family that had returned to the village. A market town price schedule was to be answered for every market town passed through.
The field work for the Agricultural Survey extended from March 8th to 23rd. For the City Survey the family investigation extended from March 9th to April 2nd with supplementary work April 19th to 23rd; the building investigation, from March 15th to June 15th. During the longer period for the building investigation there was little change in contents already lost, but there were some cases in which partial taking away of building materials occurred. Rebuilding during the period was practically nil.
Both in training the investigators and in supervising the tabulation work it was fortunate that an experienced man trained in Agricultural Economics was available as supervisor; and some men who formerly worked in Professor Buck’s tabulation department were here to help in that work. In the writing of the report and the interpretation of the results of the survey the Director has had the invaluable cooperation of Dr. M. S. Bates of the University of Nanking whose extensive knowledge of economic history and of conditions in China has thrown light on the statistical findings.
Both the Agricultural and Family Surveys were based on a sample instead of attempting complete enumeration. Consequently, totals and grand averages are estimates based on results learned in the cases studied. But with the exception of rice seed for Luho, explained in the proper place, the date on which the estimates in the tables are based remain as reported by the investigators.
In the Agricultural Survey the average per farm family studied was worked out by hsien and then that average was multiplied by the total number of farm families in each hsien, as given by Professor Buck in his Land Utilization in China. The grand total was secured by adding up the hsien totals and any grand averages were then computed form these totals, thereby in each hsien. Although a village schedule was used to get a broader picture of general conditions, all calculations were based on the farm schedule. (See Appendix B.)
The totals in the family investigation of the City Survey were calculated by multiplying by 50 the average per family secured from a study of every 50th
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inhabited house. Likewise the estimates of loss in the building investigation were computed by multiplying by 10 the total loss secured form a study of every 10th building. In the printed tables, the convenience of the reader has been considered by dropping as many decimal places as possible. All total are given in round hundreds.
The measure of grains and vegetables was a shih tan by weight which is 100 shih chin, or one-half the metric quintal. This is 50 kilograms or 110.23 pounds, which is very close to the English hundredweight (112 lbs.), and is 0.83 of a picul. The mow used for measure of area is the local mow as reported by the farmers; but in calculations the Kiangning mow has been used, as it represents two-fifths of the cultivated area studied. It is equal to 0.06067 hectares. The shih mow (standard mow) referred to on occasion is slightly larger, 0.06667 hectares or one-sixth of an acre.
All monetary values in these reports are in Chinese currency. For the period covered in the surveys, the Chinese dollar was practically steady at about $3.40 per United States dollar or $17.00 per British pound.

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The city of Nanking had before the war a population of just 1,000,000, which was considerably reduced by repeated bombings and latterly by approaching attack and the removal of all Chinese governmental organs. At the time the city fell (December 12-13), its population was between 200,000 and 250,000. The persons reported in our sampling survey in March, multiplied by 50, give 221.150 as the population directly represented by the City Survey. This number was probably 80 to 90 per cent of the total residents at that time, some of whom lived in places not accessible to investigators. (See Note to Table 1 for fuller discussion of population).
27.500 persons were living in refugee camps maintained by the International Committee, 12 per cent of the surveyed population.1 Outside the camps, but within the Safety Zone Area were an additional 68,000 persons, 31 per cent of the total. Some idea of the crowding, the price willingly paid for partial security, is indicated by the fact that 43 per cent of the population, 14 weeks after the fall fo the city, was living in an area which had only 4 per cent of the total number of buildings noted in the Survey, and which comprised roughly one-eighth of the total area within the walls. The fact that practically no burning occurred within the Zone was a further advantage, and suggests the generally and violence outside, even though the Zone was not officially recognized by the Japanese authorities.2
1.  At its maximum in the second half of December and in January, this number was 70,000. The reduction was irregularly due to the following causes: crowding and discomforts of the camps, though they were generally preferred to the greater dangers and difficulties outside; the need to care for homes and remains of property, whenever there was sufficient security to make the effort worth while; encouragement by the International Committee for return to other parts of the city in every possible case; threats of forcible eviction from the camps as of February 4, fortunately not realized in action, but bringing about much unnecessary suffering and many regrettable incidents.
2.  We must here trace the divisions of the city as used for the purpose of the Survey. The Safety Zone Area was bounded by Han Chung Road on the South; by North Chungshan Road from Hsin Chieh K’ou past the Drum Tower to Shansi Road, on the east and northeast; by Shansi Road on the north, continued to Sikang Road, which formed the westerly boundary. Within the Safety Zone Area were the Refugee Camps, reported separately. South of the Safety Zone Area lay Cheng His, reaching to Shengchow Road, and bounded on the east by Chungcheng and Chunghwa Roads. The remaining southwest corner of the city was called Men His. The southeastern corner, north to Pai-hsia Road and east to Tungehimen, was considered as Men Tung. The region from Chungcheng Road eastward to the wall was named Cheng Tung. All the remaining northwestern, northern, and northeastern (as far south as East Chungshan Road) sections were considered Cheng Pei; this eastern section of the north City ran from North Chungshan Road to the wall bounded on the north by the Drum Tower and Peichiko. The four section outside the wall are easily recognized by their names; the Shuihsimen Area extended northward past Hanchungmen. (See City Survey map of Nanking.) The family investigators found the area outside Tungchimen deserted. Consequently, it does not occur in the family investigation but is included in the building investigation. The normally crowded sections in the southerly portions of the city (Cheng His, Men Hsi, Men Tung), were the first to show a fair degree of recovery from the practically complete depopulation of the critical period. Together they had 81,000 residents, 37 per cent of the total. (By June this number of residents had doubled, according to the City Government records of registration.) The sections thus far named had practically 80 per cent of the total for the city. There were only 8,550 persons in the districts studied outside the wall, which suffered so terribly from the burning by the Chinese army and from violence, and in March were still more dangerous on the whole than the inner city.1. Smythe, ” The Composition of the Chinese Family,” Nanking Journal, University of Nanking, November, 1935, v. 5, No. 2, p. 371-393.2. The May 31 registration figures of the Municipal Government, patently incomplete for famales, show 109.4.
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The average size of family for all sections was 4.7. Outside the wall, the average was 4.0, suggesting the presence of more men without families, or of more broken families. Compare the 1932 figures for 2.027 families in the same portions of Nanking from which many of the present population are derived. They show an average family of 4.34. 1 It is probable that in normal times there are more persons detached from their families for reasons of employment. The date on population are given in Table 1.
The March population of Nanking shwed clearly the characteristics of a war time population. The present survey reports for all ages, in all setions of the city, a sex ratio of 103.4 (males to 100 females); 2 while the 1932 study showed for all ages 114.5; and in the entire population before the war, there was a very high ratio of males to females, at one time 150. The drop of 9 points in the sex ratio since 1932 is accounted for in part by the withdrawal of males not native to Nanking but formerly working here, and in part in the ratio for the age-group 15 yo 49 years, which roughly represents the productive life of the population; here the decline was from 124 to 111, or 11 per cent. This change presents the fact that a large number of women and children are deprived of men who were the support of the family. If the comparison is carried into narrower age-groups, fluctuations are found because of the fewer cases forming the base for each figure; but the results for the 25 years of young maturity are sufficiently consistent to be startling: 15-19 years, 108 now as against 123 in 1932; 20-24 years, 106/124; 25-29 years, 100/128; 30-34 years, 89/123; 35-39 years, 105/123. The decline in the males of productive age is shown in another manner. Of all males in 1932, those 15 to 49 years old were 57 per cent; in the present survey, they were only 49 per cent, a decrease at the rate of 14 per cent, which constitutes a serious economic and social problem. Correspondingly, of all males those over 50 years of age gained from 13 per cent in 1932 to 18 per cent now, an advance of some 30 per cent.
The variations in sex ratios by sections of the city are of some importance. Although the ratio for all sections was 103, for the refugee camps it was only 80, since were overcrowded with women seeking security; on

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the other hand, in the less secure areas the men were relatively much more numerous, as is shown by the ratios for Cheng Pei, 121, the garden group, 150,outside the wall, 144. If we consider the ages for which security was a most acute problem, 15 to 39 years, we find in the refugee camps sex ratios running very low, form 40 to 67 in different five-year units; for the Safety Zone Area, roughly 90; for Cheng Hsi over 150, for outside the wall, well over 200. Thus men were returning first to the more dangerous localities, with old women and remained in places of relative safety. The data on sex and age are given in Table 2.

The families remaining in Nanking were classified as “Normal,” that is, either husband and wife or husband and wife with children living together; “Broken,” man or women with children; and “Non-family,” man alone or woman alone. Then each of these three types was repeated “with relatives.”
The “normal” families were much fewer in proportion to all families than in an earlier study made among Nanking people in more settled times, 1932: now only 4.4 per cent with husband and wife as compared with 9.5; now only 26.2 per cent with husband, wife and children instead of 33.1 per cent. This represents a reduction of these types by one-fourth. A slight increase in “Normal with Relatives” occurred: 32.3 per cent as compared with 29.8 per cent in 1932. In other words there is a net loss of normal families amounting to 9.5 per cent of the total families, or one-seventh reduction of normal families.
This decline in normal families is largely due to an increase in the broken families, 21.4 per cent as compared with only 12.9 in 1932, or an increase of 8.5 per cent for the four types of broken families. Of that increase 6.9 per cent was in families without a man for support, that is, families consisting of only women with children. This means that the number of broken families was almost doubled. This increase in broken families is more clearly understood when we realize that 14.3 per cent of the members of the families remaining in Nanking had migrated, but only 2.2 per cent of the wives lost husbands by this migration. In addition to these there were 4,400 wives, or 8.9 per cent of the wives, whose husbands had either been killed, injured or taken away, Two-thirds of these were killed or taken away, 6.5 per cent. Or more poignantly, 3,250 children (5 per cent of all children) had their fathers killed, injured or taken away. These broken families could only to a small extent be due to families being divided within the city because only 3 per cent were so reported. The three factors combined of migration, persons killed or taken away, and divided families, broke 11.7 per cent of the families remaining in Nanking, or 5,500 families.

Within the city the refugee camps showed a very high figure for broken families, especially in the case of women with children, 13.2 per cent as compared with 6.6 per cent for all sections and with 3.4 per cent in the more normal times of 1932. Fourteen per cent of the families in the refugee camps were women, children and relatives (the latter usually dependent). Altogether, 27.2 per cent of the families in the refugee camps were women with children and in some cases with dependent relatives. In the camps 35 per cent of the
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families had a women as head, while in the remainder of the population only 17 per cent of the families had a women head.
A man or woman alone constituted the family in 14 per cent of the 1932. In another 16.3 per cent of the families outside the wall, the family was a man with relatives.
For family composition analysis see Table 3.

The figures here reported are for civilians, with the very alight possibility of the inclusion of a few scattered soldiers. The reports made in the Survey indicate that 3,250 were killed by military action under known circumstances. Of those killed 2,400 (74 per cent) were killed by soldiers’ violence apart from military operations. 1 There is reason to expect under-reporting of deaths and violence at the hands of the Japanese soldiers, because of the fear of retaliation from the army of occupation. Indeed, under-reporting is cleary emphasized by the failure to record any violent deaths of young children, although not a few are known to have occurred.
Of the 3,100 receiving injuries under known circumstances, 3,050 (98 per cent) were definitely by soldiers’ violence aside from warfare. There was a noticeable tendency to ignore injuries from which some sort fo recovery had been made. 2
89 per cent of the deaths and 90 per cent of the injuries by soldiers’ violence occurred after December 13, when occupation of the city was entirely completed.
In addition to those reported killed and injured, 4,200 were taken away under military arrest. Persons seized for temporary carrying or other military labor were seldom so reported. Very few of those here mentioned were heard form in any way up to June. The fate of others reason to think that most of them were killed early in the period. 3
The figures for persons taken away are undoubtedly incomplete. Indeed, upon the original survey schedules, they were written in under the heading “Circumstances,” within the topic of deaths and injuries; and were no called for or expected in the planning of the Survey. Thus they have an unusual
1. “Military operation” is here used for shells, bombs, or bullets fired in battle.
2. Among the injuries reported to our Rehabilitation Commission by the 13,530 families applicants for relief, whom they investigated during March, was rape to the extent of 8 per cent of all females of 16-50 years. This figure is a serious under-statement, since most women who suffered such treatment would not volunteer the information, nor would their male relatives. While raping was such a common matter in December and January, people were much freer in admitting rape than under ordinary circumstances. But by March families were trying to hush up the fact that women in their families had been raped. The matter is mentioned here as illustrating the acute insecurity from which the social and economic life of the city has suffered.
3. The seriousness of “taking away” is underlined by the fact that all so listed are males. Actually many women were taken for shorter or longer service as waitresses, for laundry work, and as prostitutes. But not one of them is listed.

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significance, and are more important than the simple figures indicate. Thus, those 4,200 must contribute an important addition to the number killed by soldiers. 1
Ignoring many minor cases, the casualties of military operations and the sum of those killed and injured by soldiers’ violence, and of those taken away, represents 1 person in 23, or 1 in every 5 families.
The critical social and economic results of these killings are in part indicated by the following direct calculations form our listings. The number of women whose husbands were killed, injured, or taken away, was 4,400. 2 The number of children whose fathers were killed, injured, or taken away, was 3,250.
Of the 6,750 persons violently killed and injured, only 900 (or 13 per cent) came to grief through military operations.
The data on numbers of deaths and injuries are given in Table 4.

If we analyze by sex and age those who suffered violence or abduction, we find that the per cent of males in the killed and injured was for all ages 64, and reached for ages 30-44 the high percentage of 76, Able -bodied men were under suspicion of being ex-soldiers; many were killed for having callouses on their hands, supposed evidence of carrying rifles. Among the injured females, 65 per cent were between the ages of 15 and 29, although the terms and method of unquiry excluded rape per se.
A revealing picture of the tragedy is shown in the relatively large number of persons over 60 years old who were killed by soldiers: 28 per cent of all men so killed, and 39 per cent of the women. Elderly people were often the most reluctant to leave their homes in exposed areas, and they were considered in advance to be safe form wanton attack.
The men taken away were often accused, at least in form, of being ex-soldiers; or were used as carriers and laborers. Hence it is not surprising to find that 55 per cent of them were between the ages of 15 and 29 years; with another 36 per cent between 30 and 44 years.
The data on sex and age of deaths and injuries are given in Table 5.
Among the represented population of 221,000, no less than 58,000 were formerly employed (53,000 men and 5,000 women), equaling 26 per cent of the total population, 33 pre cent of persons 10 years and over, 38 per cent of persons 15 years and over. The women (9per cent of the total formerly
1. A careful estimate from the burials in the city and in areas adjacent to the wall, indicates 12,000 civilians killed by violence. The tens of thousands of unarmed or disarmed soldiers are not considered in these lists. Among the 13,530 applicant families investigated during March by the Committee’s Rehabilitation Commission, there were reported men taken away equivalent to almost 20 per cent of all males of 16-50 years of age. That would mean for the whole city population 10,860 men. There may well be an element of exaggeration in the statements of applicants for relief; but the majority of the difference between this figure and the 4,200 of the survey report is probably due to the inclusion of cases of detention or forced labor which the men are known to have survived.
2. The 13,530 applicant families investigated by our Rehabilitation Commission during March, reported data which indicate that 14 per cent of all women over 16 were widows.

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employed) were chiefly engaged in trade and general labor, secondarily in manufacturing and in domestic service.
Of all formerly employed, 34 per cent (20,000) were previously in trade; 18 per cent (10,500) in manufacturing and mechanical industries; 12 per cent 7 per cent (6,500) in domestic and personal service; 10 per cent (5,500) in agriculture; 7 per cent (4,000) in general labor; 6 per cent (3,500) in transportation: 5 per cent (3,000) in “combined shops” (that is, shops which both make and sell articles, and which therefore cannot be assigned exclusively to manufacturing or to trade); 3 per cent each (2,000) to public service not elsewhere classified and to professional service; 2 per cent (1,000) to clerical occupations.
The average daily earnings of the persons employed were $1.01 for the total. For those in trade, the average reported was $1.20; in manufacturing and mechanical industries, $1.08; in domestic and personal service, $0.96; in agriculture, $0.73; in general labor, $0.34. The average family income was $1.23 per day.
he data on former employment are given in Table 6.
Employment and earning in March present a dismal picture by contrast with the report of former conditions for the same people. The total employed were 20,500 of whom950 (less than 5 per cent) were women. The 20,500 constituted 9 per cent of the whole population, 12 per cent of those 10 years and over, 14 per cent of those 15 years and over.
Of the total employed, 67 per cent (13,500) were in trade, 1 12 per cent (2,500) in agriculture; 5 per cent each (1,000) in manufacturing and mechanical industries, and in domestic and personal service; 4 per cent (1,000) in transportation; 3 per cent each (500) in combined shops and in general labor; less than 1 per cent each in public service not elsewhere classified and in professional service. The average earnings per day for the total were $0.32. Those engaged in trade reported $0.31; in agriculture, $0.20; in manufacturing and mechanical industries, $0.45; in transportation, $0.42; on combined shops, $0.22; in general labor, $0.25.
The rates of employment were lowest in the refugee camps and in the eastern section of the city. They were highest among the gardeners, 17 per cent of all ages 26 per cent of those 15 years and over, Traders were bunched in the Safety Zone, and in Cheng Hsi and Men Hsi, the first districts to open up noticeably; these three areas comprised roughly 40, 20, and 20 per cent of the relatively numerous traders. The Safety Zone still contained 33 per cent of all employed, with the other named areas 15 per sent each. The combined areas outside the wall had less than 5 per cent of all employed, and Cheng Tung less than 4.
The data on current employed are given in Table 7. The number of families reporting no earnings was 37,050, or 78 per cent of all families in the city.
The number of families reporting income insufficient
1. Largely the petty peddling of daily necessities and the roadside selling of the remaining personal possessions of self or others.

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to maintain life was 44.650, or 94 per cent of all families. 2 Our observation agree with this picture. Life was continued by the use of buried hoards and other surviving accumulations; which were spread through kinship, friendship, and loans; and were supplemented by organized relief plus irregular releases from military storehouses, chiefly in the form of pay to a comparatively small number of labors.

March employment was 35 per cent of former employment among the resident population reporting; and earnings of those employed were 32 per cent of former earnings. These two factors give a gross income for all residents equal to 11 per cent of former income. This gloomy figure corresponds to the observation of those who knew the situation closely. Family earning in March were on the average $0.14 per day, as compared with $1.23 in former times. Prices were low, but not low enough to help the situation greatly.
When we compare the groups of the employed, we find that those engaged in trade were two-thirds of the former number, but earnings were only 26 per cent of former earnings; those in agriculture, under one-half, with 27 per cent of former earnings; in domestic and personal service, under one-sixth, with 47 per cent of former income; in manufacturing and mechanical industries, under one-tenth, with 35 per cent of former income; in general labor, under one-eighth, but wages of those employed were 73 per cent of old wages. Public service employment practically disappeared, as did professional service; while clerical occupations literally were not found.

At any time the diet of the mass of the people in China is basically cereal. Under the economic conditions of March, that was true a fortiori; for the poorer people had practically nothing in the way of vegetable or oils, much less of meat or fruits. Aside from a handful of families that secured flour, all others were dependent upon rice, normally the major cereal of this region. Considering all sections of the city, 17 per cent of the people were getting their rice from food kitchens 1 (free, or at a nominal charge); 64 per cent from small private dealers; 14 per cent form stores conducted by the Self- Government Committee; 5 per cent from “others,” which usually obscured the real source by interposing a friend or a relative.
Outside the wall no people could get food from the kitchens, while at the other extreme were 82 per cent of the people in the refugee camps, plainly among the poorest in the city, on the average. In the Safety Zone Area, 17
1. 17 per cent of the population was nearly 38,000. This report on the use of the food kitchens checks very closely with the International Committee’s records of feeding some 35,000 persons in late March, though minor corrections are to be made both ways because of other methods of food distribution and other organization to be considered.
2. The subsistence level was conservatively calculated at $0.26 per family per day. Gamble’s How Chinese Families Live in Peiping, p. 326, shows 1.39 shih tan per month to be the family consumption of cereals from the median group down well toward the bottom of the families studied. Rice in late March sold for $10.63 per bag of 212.25 lb. From these data the figure of $0.26 per day is derived, ignoring fuel, shelter, clothing, or any food save the dominant cereal.

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per cent were dependent on the kitchens, and in Cheng Hsi 12; both districts were adjacent to the kitchens that were in operation.
The data on sources of food occur in Table 8.

The families remaining in Nanking during the war period were in general the poorer groups, though they included many small shop-owners and house-owners. A view of their losses shows most specifically the economic condition of resident Nanking people, though it is highly inadequate to indicate the total economic blow that the city suffered, quantitatively or qualitatively.
The average losses per family were $838, of which $271 was in buildings and $567 in movables, the latter divided almost equally between movables for economic uses (such as stock for sale, shop equipment, materials for manufacture, machinery and tools), and movables for domestic uses (such as clothing and bedding, household furniture and utensils, cash and jewelry, family food and supplies, and so forth). 1 Stocks for sale was a large item, $187 per family; shop equipment, $65. For these elements of the population, losses of machinery and materials for manufacture were relatively small. Clothing and bedding losses were heavy at $115, household furniture and utensils at $110. Food and supplies were listed at only $8, cash and jewelry at $10, indications both of moderate reporting and of the poverty of many of the families.
The total losses reported in the family investigation are big enough, though they touch only a relatively poor fraction of the City. Practically $40,000,000 was recorded chiefly in the following items; buildings, 13 millions; stock for sale, 9; shop equipment, 3; for clothing and bedding, 5 millions, as also for furniture and utensils.
When the total losses of families remaining in Nanking are analyzed by causes, they show that 2 per cent were due to military operations, 52 to fire, 33 to military looting and 9 to other robbery, with 4 per cent unknown. Fire indicted almost ail the building loss, but only 31 per cent of the loss in movables, Indeed, nearly half the movables lost were taken by soldiers, and a seventh by others. The military robbery comprised over $6,000,000 of movables for economic uses, and nearly $7,000,000 of movables for domestic uses, blows each in its own way disastrous to the daily life of the Nanking population.
The data for family looses by main items and cause are given in Table 9,

If the total losses $40,000,000 of families resident in Nanking during March are assigned to the districts of the original addresses of those families (where most of the losses occurred), the results are as follows: Cheng Tung $12 millions, Men Tung 7, Cheng Hsi 6, Men Hsi and Cheng Pei Tung, each 5; others small. The total losses were divided between business and residence properties as $19 millions against $21 millions. In the more important districts, fire losses were proportionately heaviest in Men Tung, 66 per cent of all losses; in Cheng Tuna, 62; and lightest in Cheng Hsi and Men Hsi, 34 and 38 per cent of all losses. The differences in causation of loss for business and for residential
1. All money figures are in Chinese currency.

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properties were not sharply marked. As might be expected, this Population did not share largely in the big fire losses of the main commercial and industrial districts; thus their fire losses in business properties were 21 per cent of all their losses and in all properties; but were greater in residential properties, 30 per cent.
The data for family losses by section of city are given in Table 10.

The total count of street-numbers is 39,200 of which 30,500 are inside the wall and 8,700 outside. The three crowded areas of Cheng Hsi, Men Hsi, and Men Tung had nearly 60 per cent of the buildings inside the wall (17,700); indeed, 45 per cent of the grand total.
Report of destruction of damage to building was made only when the injury was sufficiently obvious from the street to call the attention of the investigator. In a number of specific examples we know of injury that was not recorded, but prefer to leave the figures as moderate as possible.
Of all buildings, 2 per cent were destroyed or damaged by military operations; 24 by fire; and additional 63 per cent by looting: a total of 89 per cent by all causes, leaving 11 per cent without obvious injury. It must be noted that most of the buildings burned within the city were thoroughly, even systematically stripped of their contents before the burning; and that practically without exception the fortunate 11 per cent were entered by soldiers who robbed to some degree, later followed by civilian thieves in unoccupied buildings.
Outside the wall, 62 per cent of the buildings were burned, even 78 per cent in the case of Tungchimen. Inside the wall, the percentage was 13, ranging from 29 in Men Tung down to 0.6 in the Safety Zone and 3.5 in the sparsely built Cheng Pei.
Military operations had noticeable effects only in the south and east parts of the city, and in ShuihSimen; though some cases must have been obscured in the areas severely burned. Looting grossly affected 73 per cent of the buildings within the wall, but is reported for only 27 per cent outside the wail, where so much was burned, reaching 84 per cent in Hsiakwan. Inside areas ran as high as 96 per cent for Chen Pei and 85 for Cheng Pei Tung; the only one below 65 was the Safety Zone Area, in which the low report of 9 per cent appears for buildings showing damage by looting.
If we turn to consider the damage by all causes according to sections, we find that inside areas averaged 88 per cent of buildings affected, outside areas 90. Cheng Pei reported the dismal figure of 99.2 per cent; and indeed all the inside areas were above 90 save the Safety Zone with 10 and Men Hsi with 78. Outside areas touched 99.7 in the case of Tungchimen and 98 in that of Hsiakwan, while ShuihSimen was favored with only 70.
The data on count of buildings damaged or looted are given in Table 11.

The building investigation shows a grand total of losses of buildings and contents for all sections of $246,000,000, of which $143 millions were in-
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curred outside the walls, and $103 millions inside. The grand total consisted first of 58 per cent movables ($143 millions), in which movables for economic uses were $114 millions, and movables for domestic uses were $29 million; and secondly of 42 per cent buildings, amounting to $103 millions. 1
The loss in economic movables was especially heavy outside the walls, amounting to $82 millions there as against $32 millions inside while on the other hand, movables for domestic uses were $23 millions within the walls and only $7 millions outside. Buildings were a little heavier outside, $55 millions against $48 millions.
When we analyze specific items in percentages of the grand total, we find that stock for sale was 30 per cent ($74 millions); shop equipment 6 per cent ($16 millions), approximated by machinery and tools with $14 millions; materials for manufacturing were 4 per cent ($10 millions); ricshas were less than 0.1 per cent ($270 thousands). Clothing and bedding accounted for a per cent ($11 millions); household furniture and utensils for nearly 4 per cent ($9 millions); family food and supplies for 0.7 per cent ($2 millions); cash and jewelry for 0.3 per cent ($700 thousand) ; bicycles for a little less; “others” for nearly 3 per cent (over $6 millions). Almost all the machinery and tool losses occurred outside the wall, as also most of the material for manufacturing and two-thirds of the shop equipment and stock for sale.
In the classification of losses of buildings and contents according to sections of the city, there are a number of points of importance. By far the heaviest total was in Hsiakwan, the largely destroyed center of transportation, storage, and manufacturing: $117 millions. Cheng Tung, Men Tung, and Men Hsi ranged from $26 millions down to $2O millions; Tungchimen reported $16 millions and Cheng Pei Tung14 millions. The smallest total losses were the Safety Zone with $4 millions and the notoriously poor area outside Shuihsimen.
Of the $117 millions lost in Hsiakwan, 69 was in economic movables, and 42 in buildings. No other area lost as much as $10 millions in economic movables, though several were above 6. After Hsiakwan, the next heaviest losers in buildings were Cheng Tung and Men Tang, with $13 and 12 millions respectively. The Safety Zone was lowest, with $551 thousands. As might be expected, there was no great concentration of losses in domestic movables, most of the areas ranged from $5 to 2 millions.
The data for total values destroyed by items and section of the city are given in Table 12.

Of the grand (or wretched) total of all losses, $246,000,000, one per cent ($3 millions) was due to military operations, which chiefly affected buildings. 67 per cent ($165 millions) was caused by fire, including 97 minions in buildings, 80 millions in stock for sale, 13 millions in machinery and tools, 10 millions in shop equipment. 31 per cent ($75 millions) of all losses were due to robbery, including 41 millions of stock for sale, 9 millions of clothing and bedding, 5 millions of shop equipment.
The data on causes of loss are given in Table 13.

1. The similarity of these two sets of figures is fortuitous but true.

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The total losses of buildings and contents, $246,000,000, were reported as $210 millions from business properties and $36 millions from residence Properties. Of the S210 millions of losses incurred by business properties, 131 millions were outside the wall, 110 of them in Hsiakwan and 15 near Tungchimen. Of the $79 millions in business losses inside the wall, 23 occurred in Cheng rung, 16 each in Men Hsi and Men Tung; 10 in Cheng Pei Tung; the Smallest losses of this type were in the Safety Zone Area, $2 millions.
The $36 millions lost in residence properties were divided into 24 millions inside and 12 millions outside the wall. Inside there were $6 millions in Men Tune, and 4 each in Men Hsi and Cheng Pei Tung; the other areas ran from 2 to 3. Of the $12 millions in residential losses outside the wall, 7 were in Hsiakwan and 3 in Chunghwamen.
If cause is considered, the heavy business losses are classified as follows: due to military operations, 1 per cent; to fire, 69 per cent; to looting, 29 per cent. The relatively lighter losses in residential properties were due to these factors: military operations, 4 per cent; fire, 59 per cent; looting, 37 per cent. The differences are explicable in part by the fact that many residences lay close to the gates seriously attacked in the southeast portion of the wall; and, for’ the more important cause of fire, to the deliberate burning of extensive commercial and industrial sections.
The data comparing losses from business and residence properties are given in Table 14.

In order to understand more clearly one aspect of the economic plight of the pity not adequately reached by the family or general building investigations, the condition and losses on 8 of the main commercial streets were listed separately for examination (though of course they are included in all general totals, and do not constitute an additional loss). These 8 streets comprised over 2,800 numbers, an average of 350 per street. They lie mainly in the southeast quadrant of the walled city.
2.7 per cent of the buildings were damaged by military operations, 33 per cent by fire, 54 per cent by additional looting (most of the burned stores were casually looted by soldiers, then regularly stripped-by the use of fleets of military trucks); making 89 per cent to suffer from all causes. Considering all causes, Pal Hsia, Chung Hwa, Chien Kang, And Tai Ping Roads were destroyed or damaged to the extent of 97 and 98 per cent of the buildings; the others, 70 to 80 per cent. From the positive side, 11 per cent escaped serious damage.

When we consider the individual streets according to the havoc wrought by different methods, we find that military operations were most obvious in Chung Cheng Road (6 per cent of buildings) and in Chung Shan Road (6 per cent), while in some they were insignificant or not reported at all. The percentage of injury by fire was greatest in Tat Ping Road with 68, followed by Chung Hwa arid Chien Kang Road with 51 and 47 respectively. Looting in

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buildings not burned was naturally the converse of are injury, since most of the preserved buildings have to be listed as looted. In Tai Ping Road only 27 per cent of the buildings are recorded as looted, as against 76 in Chung Cheng and Chu Chiao Road.
The losses of buildings and contents on the 8 main commercial Streets within the city reached a figure just short of $50,000,000, of which $47,000,000 was in commercial buildings and their contents. In the report just following, it should be remembered that percentages and differences among the streets are listed in terms of dollars’ worth of property lost, not in numbers of buildings as in the items of preceding paragraphs. Chung Hwa Road lost most heavily, with $12,500,000, a fourth of the total for the 8 streets; Chung Cheng Road, $11,000,000; Tai Ping Road, $9,000,000; Chung Shan Road, $6,000,000; Chien Kang and Pai Hsia Roads, $4,000,000 each; Sheng Chow Road, $2,000,000; Chu Chiao Road (the southern extension of Tal Ping Road), $1,000,000.
If the money losses on the 8 Streets are divided by causes, we find 0.7 per cent by military operations, 65 per cent by fire, 28 by additional looting, 6 reported as unknown. When individual streets are considered, Chien Kang Road reported 98 per cent of losses due to fire, Chung Cheng Road 87, Chung Hwa 77, Pai Hsia 69. For additional looting, the streets appear in the converse order, since unburned property is now the subject; Chu Chiao Road 72 per cent of losses due to looting, Chung Shan Road 61, Sheng Chow 47, Tai Ping 29. For Tai Ping, Sheng Chow, and Chu Chiao Roads in particular, sizable percentages are recorded as unknown, doubtless a combination of fire and looting, which must be to some extent interfused in all reports under these two headings.
The data on losses on main commercial streets are shown in Tables 15 and 16.

The weight of total losses may be in part appreciated by an estimate of their extent per family of the original population, which can be calculated with fair approximation. 1 In a sense these figures are academic, since they include the few public buildings destroyed and some important institutional properties, while excluding personal, public, and institutional property removed before the taking of the city. Yet they serve both to bring down figures of hundreds of millions to thinkable concreteness, and to correct the misleading impression given by the low reports from the relatively poor families remaining in Nanking.
The total loss reports show an average per family of $1,262, of which $527 was in buildings, $582 in economic movables, $152 in domestic movables.The economic movables comprised $377 worth of stock for sale, $80 of shop equipment, $73 of machinery and tools, $51 of materials for manufacture, $1 in ricshas. The domestic movables comprised $58 worth of clothing and bedding, $44 of household furniture and utensils, $9 of family food and supplies, $4 of cash and jewelry, $S of bicycles.
1. We find a close check between direct use of the factors of total loss, population considered, and number of persons per family; And on the other hand loss Per house-number divided by our figures of 4.9 families per house-number in the original population considered.

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The data on losses per family of original residents are shown in the right hand column of Table 13.
When the losses per family of the original population are compared with the losses of the families remaining in Nanking, it is seen that the buildings are nearly doubled ($527 to $271), and movables for economic uses are actually doubled ($582 to $291), while domestic movables are almost halved ($152 to $276). These reports fairly represent the two situations: the total losses for the entire city were a half greater per family of its population than were the losses for the families remaining in Nanking ($1,262 to $838). The city-wide losses included the larger properties of all types: commercial, industrial, institutional. On the other hand, many domestic goods were removed by those who migrated; and losses of the domestic goods which they left in Nanking could not be adequately reported.
The data for comparison of losses for families remaining in Nanking and for all families in the original population may be found in Tables 9 and 13.

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The Agricultural Survey attempted to cover the Ningshu Area, a natural and historical unit of six hsien grouped around Nanking. Two of the hsien, Kiangpu and Luho, lie north of the Yangtze River; while to the south are Kiangning (in which Nanking is located), Kuyung, Lishui, and Kaoshun. Owing to conditions explained in Appendix A on Organization and Method, Kaoshun and half of Luho could not be investigated in March. The 4.5 hsien included in the survey had at that time a maximum of 1,080,000 farm population, probably 1,200,000 to 1,350,000 before the war. They also included market towns which originally had some 275,000 inhabitants 1 and the city of Nanking, formerly with a million, shrunken to approximately 250,000 in March. Thus the whole population of the 4.5 hsien was roughly a million and a half in March (the people of the market towns, however, do not enter the scope of the Surveys). The land area of the 4.8 hsien is 2,438 sq. m., 1 about that of the State of Delaware or of two fair-sized English counties. Of this area, almost exactly one-third is cultivated, 819 sq. m, 2 It is important to note the bulk of Kiangning Hsien in the Agricultural Survey, It comprises 41 per cent of the cultivated area in the 4.6 hsien, and almost the same percentage of the total farm population.

The five types of farm losses reported (buildings, labor animals, major farm implements, stored grain, crops destroyed) totalled nearly $4l,000,000 in the four and one-half hsien, or $220 per family. It is important to note that the approximate annual income of a farm family in East Central China, as indicated by Buck’s figure for the value of all goods consumed per year by an average family, is $289. 3 The margin of savings and possible rate of accumulating farm capital are so small that the loss of three-fourths of a year’s income is a fearful blow to farm families, both in productive power and in standard of life. 4 Losses of $220 per family in the present calamity may be compared with the 1931 flood losses of $457, 5 and the 1932 war losses of $147. 6 (Both the
1. Estimated from Buck’s figures in Land Utilization in China, Statistics, P.417.
2. Buck, Statistics, P. 24, shows the correct government figures to be 6315 sq. km. and 2122 sq km., respectively, from which the sq. m. are now caluculated.
3. Buck, Chinese Farm Economy, P. 387. All money figures are in Chinese currency.
4. On data of fifteen years ago (from only three localities, and at lower valuations and prices than he has recently given) Buck reports a farm capital for Kiangsu averaging $478. This figure includes buildings, livestock, supplies, farm equipment, not land and trees. Total capital with land he gives as $1,775, subject of course to problems of tenancy and mortgage. Chinese Farm Economy, p.57 For Kiangning Hsien, so large an element in the Ningshu area, a current estimate of $743 is given for the average former’s buildings, implements, livestock, and furniture. R. T. Ts’ui, Land Classification of Kiangning Hsien, soon to be published in “Economic Facts.”
5. The 1931 Flood in China, p.13.
6. By anothcr calculation, $135 per family.

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surveys of 1931 and of 1932 included many smaller items not reported this year; and the unit prices used in 1931 are much above the low ones now employed). Lishui Hsien suffered the heaviest losses per family, $302; the large and populous Kiangning, $251; Luho only $111; Kuyung rising to $147; and Kiangpu to $239, nearest to the general average of $220.
Buildings alone comprised 59 per cent of the total reported losses, $129 per family. This means that 1.7 chien 1 of buildings per family, or two-fifths of all farm buildings in the area, were destroyed―most of them by burning. Building losses were particularly heavy in Lishui, 2.8 chien per family; in Kiangpu, 2; and in Kiangning, 1.9. The total number of chien destroyed was 308,000 valued at $24,000,000.
Labor animals were second in importance among the types of losses, accounting for 16 per cent of the total, and 0.66 of an animal per family. The latter figure seems high, particularly the portion of it relating to water-buffaloes. In the 1931 flood, the general average for labor animals lost was 0.44 per family, counting the three kinds of animals listed in this survey. 2 Buck reports a normal figure for the Yangtze rice-wheat area of only 0.71, but 1.20 for the important Kiangning hsien, 3 the only one of our hsien there recorded. War losses of animals were proportionately higher in Kiangning (0.84), and in Kiangpu and Luho. For the whole area, the loss was 123,000 head (buffaloes, oxen, donkeys), valued at $6,700,000 or $36 per family. 4
Farm implements represented 13 per cent of all reported losses, and amounted to 3.55 items per family. It appears that most of these losses were of the wooden portions of the implements, burned with the buildings or taken for fuel; the wooden element is largest in the indispensable and costly manybladed pumps for the irrigation of rice-fields. (0.6 per family). Present losses of the principal tools appear to be a half greater than in the flood of 1931. 5 Buck gives 6.5 items for the normal average (Yangtze Rice-wheat Area, mediumsize farms) of the types of implements listed in this survey. 6 Implement losses were heaviest in Kiangning and Lishui, medium in Kiangpu. For the whole area, the loss was 661,000 implements, valued at $5,240,000 or $28 per family. 7
Stored grain counted 10 per cent of all losses, and in quantity amounted to 1,100,000 shih tan, or 6.1 shih tan per family; of which half was rice, a sixth wheat, and a sixth soybeans. Kuyung, at 7.5 shih tan per family, Lishui at 7.2, and Kiangning at 6,1, suffered most severely; Luho very lightly at 2.7. The
1. A chien is the space between main rafters, averaging about 11′ x 16′. Farm residences often contain 4 chien. other farm buildings 2 chien. See Table 17 Note 1.
2. The 1931 Flood in China, p. 17.
3. Buck, Statistics, P. 122-l23.
4. Buck many years ago indicated for Kiangsu Province a normal inventory amounting to $53. Chinese Farm Economy, P. 57.
5. The 1931 Flood in China. p.18.
6. Statistics, p, 396.
7. Buck earlier reported for Kiangsu Province a normal equipment value of $64.Chinese Farm Economy. p.57.

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average family in the war areas of 1932.lost just over 2 shih tan. The average loss in the flood of 1931 was 4.2 piculs (5.1 shih tan). 1 The recent grain losses reached a value of $4,200,000, or $22 per family. 2

Crops destroyed were fortunately a small loss, only 2 per cent of the total. For the winter wheat, like some of the younger women, was partly hidden in the ground during the worst period, Yet this item, relatively small though it was, indicates a real burden upon farm families. More than 8 per cent of the area planted to wheat was destroyed, chiefly by the soldiers’ feeding of animals. In Kiangning and Kuyung the crop from 40 to 50 per cent of the intensively cultivated vegetable plots was lost to the farmer. The area of all winter crops destroyed was proportionately highest in Kuyung, 1.4 mow per family; and lowest in Kiangning, 0.62. The total area destroyed was 137,200 mow, or 0.85 per family; the total value $785,000 or $4 per family. The types of recent war losses differ from those of the 1931 flood as fire from water. Counting in values, buildings destroyed in the present calamity are 31 times the crops ($129 per family, as against $4). In 19S1, crops were twice the buildings ($215 per family, as against $108). 3 The 1932 war areas (rural) near Shanghai resembled Ningshu of the past few months, showing building losses as 28 times Crops ($97 as against $3.50). The data regarding farm losses are reported in Tables 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, of which the first three are general.

The importance of food production in this area, and its bearing upon relief needs, is emphasizcd by two facts. First, the 4.5 hsien here studied have an abnormally large city and town population. Even in the depleted condition of Nanking, it had at least 67,000 families, about one-fourth the number of a year ago; the market towns normally have 53,400 families, from which an unknown number should be subtracted for war migrants; the farm families originally numbered 186,000, from which a possible 30 per cent were absent in March as families, and an additional 11 per cent as individuals. 4 If we add these three figures, without making allowances, to form a total for the area, it exaggerates the importance of the farm families; yet even on this basis, they number only 61 per cent of the total, as against 22 for Nanking and 17 for the market towns. Compare the percentages for the Yangtze Rice-wheat Area as a whole: farms 83; cities 5; market towns. 12. 5 Secondly, transport of food from a distance has been practically impossible under war conditions, and there is scant improvement in sight. Most of the rice brought into Nanking this spring has come from Lishui and Kaoshun.
1. The 1931 Flood in China. P.12.
2. In the prices of fifteen years ago. Buck valued the normal inventory of grain in Kiangsu province as $29. Chinese Farm Economy, P. 57.
3. The 1931 Flood in China, p. 13.
4, Cf. Table 21, Note (****) and reference. Also Appendix B. 5, Buck, Land Utilization in China, p. 365.

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A large part of the cultivated land in this area in normally put into winter crops. 3 For Ningshu, Lin says 70 to 80 per cent; 4 for the Yangtze Rice-wheat Area, Buck reports 62 per cent, and for Kiangning Hsien, 5 92; for Kiangning, Ts’ui in his recent and close study, says 65 per cent. 6 In general, the winter crop is followed by a summer crop on the same land; while the remainer of cultivated land grows a spring crop. Thus, in use of land, the winter crops represent 40 or more per cent of all crops, and are a large factor in the farm economy as well as in food production for the whole community.

Last autumn’s planting of winter crops was 1,629,000 mow (8,75 per family), or 47 per cent of the cultivated land. If we follow Ts’ui, whose figure seems the best-founded in itself and is supported by the best of Buck’s figures (the regional one), this would mean that 47/65, or 72 per cent of normal planting, was carried out. War conditions of active preparations and of bombing, prevailed through portions of this region all through the autumn, and became acute at some points before the normal planting time. Moreover, the weather was unusually dry, another cause of delay which pushed some farmer along till early December, when the full calamity came and field work was impossible, Of the planting, 64 per cent was in wheat, 20 per cent in barley.

Of the winter crops planted, 9 per cent are reported as destroyed. The estimated losses were 172,000 shih tan, or in money $765,000. Kuyung Hsien lost most heavily, 18 per cent; Kiangpu only 4; the remainder not far from the average. The different crops suffered at about the same level, save 33 per cent for the intensively cultivated and not inconsiderable plots of vegetables, which were persistently attractive to soldiers, as were the other crops to military horses.
On the area planted but not destroyed (72 per cent of normal, discounted 9 per cent, leaving 65 per cent of normal) farmers expected 63 per cent of normal crops, fairly uniform according to grains. Remarkably dry weather prevailed until March; and there was also minor injury not to be classed as destruction, along with excess of weeds. Nevertheless, the expectation seems low, and this percentage may be colored by the farmers’ thoughts of their total yield in ordinary times. To that extent, this figure represents a comprehensive estimate of expectations and shortage. However, the questions were sharply stated, and the investigators and farmers tried to provide the proper answers. If we take 63 per cent of the remaining 65 per cent of normal planting, the result would be an expectation of 41 per cent of the ordinary crop. Perhaps the truth lies between the percentages of 41 and 63. Two later factors must be mentioned. Beginning in March, there was better rainfall, with marked
1. In the following paragraphs, unless otherwise specified, wheat, barley, rapeseed, broadbeans, and field peas are considered; in certain of the tables, vegetables are also recorded.
2. D. Y. Lin. letter March 2, 1938.
3. Statistics, p. 207.
4. Land Classification of Kiangning Hsien.

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improvement of the prospects. But in June the rainfall has been excessive at the time of wheat harvest in some localities, with great spoilage before threshing.

What does the harvest of wheat and barley mean in provision of food for the population of the hsien studied and the city population linked with them? It is expected to provide 3.40 shih tan of grain per family, which would feed them for less than seven weeks, according to grain consumption reports by Buck and by Gamble for farm and city populations, respectively. 1
The data regarding winter crops are found in Tables 21, 30, 31, 32, of which 21 is general.

Data on this subject are perhaps the least satisfactory in the survey, and they are not counted in the list of losses (where they are of course involved in the losses of stored grain). Answers to inquiries, even assuming that questions were skilfully pressed, concerned estimates and wants rather than plain statements of fact; and in several items seed was also food, in a time of scarcity and uncertainty. Nevertheless the results of the survey were very moderate, and on the whole gave confidence in the essential integrity of farmers and investigators. The requirements reported total $2.87 per family, under 0.9 shih tan. Comppare the 1931 flood data, which show a total want of winter and spring seeds in terms of 2.7 piculs (3.3 shih tan), of which spring seeds were 1.67 piculs (2,1 shih tan), the latter alone more than double the reports of the present inquiry. 3

Farmers reported that they intended to plant, on the average, nearly mow per family of the 18.5 mow which they ordinarily would put into rice; and that they needed seed to the extent of almost 5 shih chin per mow of the intended planting. Was such an estimate unreasonable? Buck gives seed use as 5 per cent of total rice production in the Yangtze Rice-wheat Area, which on the base of most frequent yield works out at 19.3 shih chin per Kiangning mow.3 Ts’ui’s recent data for Kiangning would give 26.6 shih chin. 4 Traditional allowances are lower. In any case, the farmers’ figures do not seem excessive.
Among the types 0f 8Ced required, rice represented 66 per cent by value, and soybeans 20. Total value was $570,000, of which $376,000 was rice. It is inferred that there were serious individual and local difficulties, but that by one means or another most of the families affected could find some Way of secur
1. Statistics, p, 417, shows 239.450 families in the 4.5 hsien, including town families. We count 67,000 families in Nanking, making a total of 306,450 families. The average consumption of grain per farm family of 5.79 individuals, is 2.3 shih tan per month, based on the averages of three localities in South Kiangsu (Wutsin 1, Wutsin 2, and Changshu) as given in Statistics pp; 105,107. For the city families, Gamble’s figures for a median income group (which extends with slight change down even to $10 per month) are employed, working out at 1.39 shih tan. The weighted average of these two types of consumption is 2.1 shih tan monthly for all families in the area considered. How Chinese Families Live in peiping, p. 326.
2. The 1931 Flood in China, p. 80.
3. Statistics, pp. 238, 210.
4. Land Classification of Kiangning Hsien, soon to appear in “Economic Facts.”

― 21 ―

ing heed for the fields they would be able to prepare for cultivation under the conditions of this spring.
The data regarding seed requirements are reported in Table 22.

Investigators’ reports show that 133,000 members of farm families resident in March (11 per cent of the estimated original members of those families) had left and had not returned. It must be remembered that possibly three times as many persons in entire families were still away; but we cannot accurately consider them because of inadequate information. (See Appendix B.). Of the 133,000 migrants, 111,000 were from Kiangnig, 11,000 from Lishui, and 8,000 from Luho. The absent members from Kiangning were 20 per cent of the estimated total original population; perhaps this hsien was especially high because of its proximity to Nanking, the abundance of communications, and the association of individuals directly or indirectly with the government and private enterprises so largely removed before December 1937. 1

Separate inquiries were made as to the original number of laborers in the family, the actual number of laborers, and the number expected back soon. The results show the actual shortage of laborers to be serious in Kiangning, 19 per cent; but the majority of absentee laborers were expected to return soon, leaving a predicted shortage of 18,000 or 7 per cent of the original number of laborers. For the 4.5 hsien, the actual shortage was 15 per cent; the expected shortage, 8 per cent or 42,800. The expected shortage was highest in Lishui, 12 per cent; and in Luho, 11. (Again see Appendix B for the possible shortage through the absence of whole families.2
Data on migration and labor supply are recorded in Table 23.

The total deaths reported were 31,000 or 29 per 1,000 residents for the 100 days covered, at the rate of 106 per annum. Compare the normal death rate for China of 27 per annum. 3 87 per cent of the deaths were caused by violence, most of them the intentional acts of soldiers. One was killed in every seven families, equivalent to a total of some 1,700,000 killings if the same rate were applied to the rural families of the United States; over 8,000,000 among the farm families of all China; perhaps 800,000 among the strictly defined farm families of Japan proper. The conditions of this region and the methods of the survey were such as practically to exclude soldiers of any sort, though it is possible that a few local men acting as police or guards were included. The
1. Migration within the hsien. or within this group of hsien, would leave the family within the net of this survey insofar as the sampling is satisfactory; though some escape in the hills is probable. In the 1931 flood, the total migration of families and of individuals showed more than 70 per cent of migrants remaining within the same hsien; and, apparently, a little more than 20 per cent migrating to other hsien, whether or not adjoining ones. The 1931 Flood in China, pp. 27, 33.
2. It is interesting to note the report of 2.8 laborers in an average family originally numbering 6.5. This suggests that according to the farmers’ own interpretation of the terrm “laborer” there are some 43 per cent of the family to be so considered.
3. Land Utilization in China, p. 338.

― 22 ―

rate of killing was highest in Kiangpu, 45 per 1,000 in the 100 days; Kuyung 37, Kiangning 21, the others 15 and 12; for the 4.5 hsien, 25.The per cent of males among the killed was terrific, especially up to 45 years, and amounted to 84 per cent of the killed for all ages. Among the 22,490 males killed, those falling between 15 and 60 years were 80 per cent, a real drain upon economic strength. Among the 4,380 females killed, 83 per cent were above 45 years. More of the younger women migrated in search of safety, or were kept out of harm’s way in times of obvious danger; while old women did more than their share of guard duty, as supposably less liable to attack than young women or able-bodied men.

Deaths from sickness were reported as very low, totalling 4,080 or 3.8 per thousand residents in the 100 days. This is apparently a serious under-reporting; none at all was recorded under the age of 5 years, for example. A similar tendency is noticeable in normal times, and in the past winter attention was inevitably centered upon the great number of abnormal deaths. It is also possible that some deaths by sickness were confused with the killed, though the original questions presented the two as alternatives; and the margin of this confusion, as tested by comparison with the normal death rate, could not have been large enough to affect in noticeable degree the number reported as killed.The 100 days occurred in a healthy season with unusually mild and fair weather, after two successive years of big harvests. It is plain that there was no epidemic or extraordinary disease.In the great flood of 1981, deaths were reported at the rate of 22 per 1,000 during an almost identical period of time; of the deaths, 70 per cent were definitely attributed to disease, and 24 per cent to drowning. 1 The present survey indicates only 12 per cent from sickness, which could at most be doubled by complete reporting. This only serves to emphasize the extent of the killings.Data on deaths are reported in Tables 24 and 25.

Although before the war the rural population of the 4.5 hsien studied was not much greater than that of Nanking, at the period of the survey in March it was more than four times as great. While the remaining farm families lost only dome 11 per cent of their members by migration. and possibly as many as 30 per cent went away and stayed away as entire families; the city lost by migration 14 per cent of the members of remaining families, and some 75 per cent of the original families entire. The surveyed population in Nanking was 221,000, as against 1,078,000 in the farm villages.On the farms, one resident in every 7 families was killed. In the city, one resident in every 5 families was killed, injured, or taken away; which works out to about an equal degree of social evil and distress.The total farm losses were $41,000,000, with no domestic property reported. The total losses for families remaining in Nanking were $40,000,000; while those of buildings and contents for the entire city were $246,000,000.


1. The 1931 Flood in China, p. 37.
― 23―

The farm losses per family (domestic property not considered) were $220, of which buildings were $129. Among the city population remaining, all losses per family were $838, of which buildings accounted for 271, stock for sale $187, and domestic movables $276. Total city losses divided among original families would run to $1,262, of which buildings counted for $527 stock for $377, and domestic movables $152.
It is not possible to compute the losses of farm and city in ratio to their respective total property values. It seems, however, that the farmer’s losses do not weigh so heavily against his major property, land; as do the city people’s losses against their total property. In any case, the farmer’s basic capital for production has not been destroyed; while many city people have lost all important material means of production. These comments are not intended to lessen appreciation for the suffering and hardships of the large farm population; but merely to suggest that the average farmer has left to him more to struggle with and more to struggle for, than the average denizen of Nanking in this year of distress.

― 24―


The loss of 40 per cent of all farm buildings is a critical blow at the farmer’s capital, his standard of living, and his productive power. Some families or parts of families have been delayed in their return to the land because of lack of housing; that means shortage of labor, lessened production, even further worsening through neglect or robbery in the farmer’s absence. Moreover, the preservation and care of animals, implements, and stored crops is affected by deficiency of buildings. In recent heavy rains, some farmers were unable to prevent their cut wheat from spoiling before threshing, and did not even have a place for improvised indoor threshing.

Working power is affected by shortage of laborers, of animals, and if implements. Deficiency of laborers is due (1) to irremediable deaths and injuries and to suck war migration as will not be reversed in a few months; (2) more largely, to personal insecurity, especially for women. Improvement in such matters depends upon the purpose and the quality of government, a field which relief workers do not enter. Both animals and implements are insufficient, though farmers have done well in exchange and borrowing and cooperation, to make the most of what they have. Direct aid for the bringing in of animals, tools, and wood needed for handles and blades for implements, is desirable. Credits to assist in purchases, and in maintenance of breeding stock and young animals, are widely needed. In principle, and usually in practice, credit can be most usefully and most safely extended through cooperative societies.

Seed does not appear to be a separate problem henceforward. However, grain is the staple food; and serious shortage of food would press some farmers hard for seed.

The current wheat crop is seriously below normal, hurting farm incomes, and constituting a factor in the total food problem. Nevertheless, old supplies of various grains seem adequate to carry, till the autumn rice-harvest, all who have a little purchasing power or credit. More significant is the question of the coming rice crop, which cannot be accurately answered without further inquiry in July after the completion of transplanting. Interrogation of farmers and travelers from different localities brings a picture of wide variation: at many points a practically normal planting; at others a distressing deficiency.

Farmers are scarcely able to restore their injured capital and productive power, while short in those same necessities, and while working under conditions which in part are still those of war and military occupation. For example, as soon as spring crops were in around Nanking many farmers sold their buffalo for slaughter rather than take the risk of keeping the animal. Much less is there any margin against flood or drouth. After two years of excellent harvests, chanceful nature does not guarantee the next two. Indeed, there is already

― 25 ―

great concern over the probability of flood in this Ningshu area sprawled across and along the Great River, excessively drenched in June rains and threatened by the extraordinary levels of the Middle and Upper Yangtze, plus the complication of the Yellow and Hwai waters through the Grand Canal (which overload the out-flow from the Lower Yangtze.)

In thinking of this years relief problem by comparison with that of the flood in 1931, there is the apparent difference that then there was one government concerned with the problem as a whole, and putting large resources into relief. Under existing conditions there are various authorities (in some sections none), the more important of which are so intensely concerned with military and political operations, and are receiving so little of regular revenue from the localities considered, that relatively small efforts at relief have been made thus far. Surely the facts themselves appeal to all present authorities, however constituted, to do their utmost in constructive aid to farmers. Such aid is not only a humanitarian necessity but will strengthen the economic basis of the community and of the government itself, and will be worth infinitely more than propaganda in securing the good will and cooperation of the people. Furthermore, the needs are so great that the total of all potential aid, public and private, would still be inadequate. The experience and resources of the China International Famine Relief Committee, or of any other private, non-political organization concerned with relief, should be welcome as useful supplements to the large-scale relief that governmental authorities ought to be undertaking.

Freedom of transport by water, rail, and highway, is essential to any considerable recovery. In practice such freedom is dependent upon actual security as well as upon policy. Improvement of transport is acutely necessary both for producers and for consumers of food and of household requirements of all sorts. Fuel and raw materials are largely unprocurable in the places where they are most needed.

In normal times needs for credit were great, and interest rates high. Now normal supplies of credit are generally missing, and the necessities for credit are multiplied. Both farms and city need all types of banking and means for transfer of money and credit.

The need for security cannot be over emphasized. In many places, over a period of months, normal labor and normal family life have been continually disturbed by violence; while tranport and credit and the incentive for productive effort, alike on the farm and in the shop, have been hamstrung by insecurity. The farmers and the city workers have done splendidly in helping themselves under adverse conditions, but further progress is dependent upon adequate safety for communications; protection of persons and private property against soldiers, bandits, and robbers of all types ; and in particular, safe facilities for banks and for stocks of commodities. If political and military conditions do not provide better security, misery will continue and may increase. Insecurity and misery have bred a large part of the present insecurity; and the vicious circle will not easily be broken without unified, vigorous, and enlightened government.

The comparison of the effects of the war upon the farms and upon the city suggests that in the Nanking region more of the cultivators will pull through

― 26 ―

without planned aid, than will artisans and shopkeepers and peddlers. Even in the city, however, tribute must be paid to a population that could endure the experiences of December to March as the climax of a war period, and still have only 35 per cent securing food in part by relief whether through kitchens or through cash. There has been an upturn since March, but reserves are now lower. Furthermore, material resources, excepting for agricultural products,are continually being consumed without chance of replacement. Deterioration is also taking its toll daily. Further economic trouble would bring a sharp worsening. But administrators of public welfare in the United States or in some other countries may well marvel at the endurance and self-reliance of the plain Chinese People. The price, however, in health and in all opportunities of life has been heavy, and ought not to be further exacted.
It has been demonstrated that refugee camps are no longer needed as a major method of relief in Nanking. There are sufficient looted and damaged houses to shelter the present reduced population. Relief can best proceed through homes and personal services, supplying food, medical care, employment, credit, aid in reuniting separated families, to such degrees as ability, intent, and resources permit. Communal cooking may, however, become necessary if fuel stocks are not made available to the public. Every possible encouragement should be given to the restoration and development of municipal services: police, sanitation, light, water, public works. If only some system of garbage disposal could be instituted, health conditions would improve. A police force with some authority could rapidly check the nightly depredations on property and persons.
Finally, reports of losses and of needs are necessarily in terms of totals and averages. It must never be forgotten that many persons, families, villages or city streets, have suffered far more grievously than statistics or generalizations show. The reckoning for the whole community will gain from the corresponding items on the better side of the average; but that by no means brings automatic compensation to those in the worse position. Relief efforts must look to the actual persons in greatest need, not merely to mathematical reports.

― 27 ―

1. Field Procedure.
The technique of random sampling was followed instead of trying to locate ”average villages” as done by Professor J. L. Buck in his surveys, because the difficulties existing in the situation made it improbable that investigators could go over the ground twice. Furthermore, it was not possible to put into the field a large group of trained observers such as worked in the war survey of rural areas around Shanghai in 1932. Lacking these opportunities and realizing how patchy war damage was in 1932, it was thought that a random sample selected at regular intervals would be less likely to misrepresent than would a hasty selection of “average villages.” Furthermore, there is something to be said in principle for such random sampling by regular intervals as usually less subjective than the attempt to select ”representative cases.” The one instance in which this method seems to have failed is the average size of farm in Kiangpu Hsien and the resulting excess of total cultivated area. (See Table 17).
The procedure was more successful than at first expected. However, the investigators in Luho Hsien were stopped by the Chinese authorities in control of the northern part of the hsien, and were held as spies until a letter from the committee was sent to them. The same difficulty occurred in Kaoshun Hsien so early in the field work that that hsien had to be dropped from the results. Only the southern half of Luho is included in the reports. In Lishui Hsien the Chinese authorities in control sent a guard with the investigators; and the guard compelled the investigators to go to villages which they selected and to families in the villages selected by the village head. Consequently, their sample tended to come from the worse areas. In the western part of Kiangning Hsien the investigators let local expediency interfere with selecting every tenth family. A careful check on sampling village by village revealed errors both ways or so haphazard that any attempt at correcting for them by weighting would be just as likely to increase the error as to reduce it. So no correction wad attempted. The men in Kuyung, Kiangpu, and Luho followed their sampling instructions very systematically.
At the start of the building investigation in the City Survey, it was only intended to cover the main streets. But it was found difficult to fit together the family and building investigations, because the families remaining in the city were only one-fourth and the poorer part of the original population. Consequently, in order to get an estimate of total damage, the building survey was extended to every building in the city. If this had been expected at the beginning a smaller sample than one in ten would have been taken for estimating
― 28 ―

value of loss, with consequent greater speed in securing results. but possible sacrifice of accuracy.
2. Statistical Procedure. The adequacy of the sample in the Agricultural Survey with 1 family in 206, is midway between the 1 to 359 families in the 1931 flood survey and the 1 to 79 in the survey of the rural areas affected by the Shanghai hostilities (1932). However, the ratio was much lower in Kiangning Hsien (1: 398) and relatively high in Lishui Hsien (1: 140). (See Table 17).
3. Checks on Accuracy.
(1) Previous surveys were available in the form of The 1931 Flood in China, and the “Survey of the Rural Areas affected by the Shanghai Hostilities (1932)” as well as Buck’s Land Utilization in China. For instance if the hisen average for rice seed needed as reported in the 1931 flood survey (Table 17) were applied to the 4.5 hsien in the present study, it would yield a figure of 211,000 shih tan needed. The result herein (Table 22) is only 125,200 shih tan. The average loss per family, $220. is not too much greater than the loss of $147 per family in the Shanghai hostilities in 1932 when the more prolonged destruction in this area is taken into consideration. The comparisons are made under each item of loss of damage. The Land Utilization in China was useful in comparing reported losses with actual farm inventory in normal times.
(2) Independent figures have been secured wherever possible. Independent estimates of the total cultivated area involved were used to check farming area covered. (See Table 17). For the current Nanking city population there are the number of persons registered by the Japanese in December and January, and the registration totals given by the new City Government for May 31st, 1938. No independent count or valuation of buildings in Nanking has been obtainable. Comparison of family losses in the city with losses reported to relief investigators was not possible on all items because their information was much more sketchy and for buildings they failed to secure values of losses in the majority of cases. But on the items of bedding, clothing and money, they reported an average loss of $162.83 per family helped in March (9,256 families).Our figure of $124.96 for family loss of the same items is conservative, even allowing for the fact that the above were “relief families”―though 20 per cent of all families in the city! For comparison with normal conditions of the Nanking population representing the areas and classes that remained, the study of 2.027 families by Smythe in 1932 was the only work available. It made possible, however, some estimate of deviation from “normal.” A further independent check in the city Survey was that the group doing the study had lived through the situation and at every point could critically examine every result to see whether it agreed with known circumstances. (But in no case were survey results altered). The most striking agreement was the low percentage of damage caused by military operations which fact was readily observed by many on December 14th. Conversely, the extent and method of the burning and looting could only be understood by eyewithesses. The survey more accurately measures the extent and value of the damage done.

― 29 ―

(3) Internal consistency and moderation in both the Agricultural and City Surveys support the general conclusions and most points in detail. Such internal checks have been applied all through the report so only a few instances need be cited here. In the Agricultural Survey the variation in hsien results are within the responsible expectation of what is known of local conditions. Except for crops destroyed (a small factor in the total), the order of loss by hsien shows a fair degree of correlation between items.In the City Survey the average loss per family as shown by the family investigation agrees very well with that shown by the building investigation when allowance is made for the fact that the poorer section of the population remained (though by no means limited to the very poor). (Compare Tables 3 and 27.) The sex and age distribution of the killed and taken away agrees with the decline of proportion of young males as compared with figures for the 1932 population. The family composition analysis shows a proportion of broken families similar to what one would expect in view of the number of persons migrating, killed and taken away, Compare Tables 2, 3, And 5.)For instances of moderation, the prices used in estimating agricultural losses are actual current prices which were below average; stored grain losses of 5.9 shih tan, while about the same as in the case of the 1931 flood and the 1932 Shanghai hostilities, are low considering the time of year and the fact that the troop movements and military occupation in this area followed two large rice harvests. Furthermore, this year’s rice crop had little chance to move before the critical period.The city losses are moderate. $271 would only build a very modest house (and a high per cent of families remaining owned their houses); $29l worth of movables for economic uses is quite within range of the small trade group remaining; as is also the figure of $276 for domestic movables. The total property loss of $838 per family is only equal to two year’s income previous to hostilities. The item on which exaggeration could have been most expected, in view of the extent of military looting that had taken place, was money. Yet that is only $9.53 per family―less than what every family not on relief must have paid monthly for rice in order to survive. (See Table 9.)APPENDIX B.MIGRATION OF WEOLE FAMILIES ITS POSSIBLE INFLUENCE ON REPORTS OF RESIDENT POPULATION, MIGRATION,LOSSES, LABOR SUPPLY, DEATHS. As a supplement to the survey of farm families, investigators were asked to make careful inquiries from at least three leading men in every third village on the survey route, as to their estimate for their own village people on the same points included in the farm family Survey. 1 This method was employed in the Flood Survey of 1931, and more widely in the Land Utilization Survey under Dr. Buck’s direction. In March, 224 villages were reported in this manner, an average of 50 per hsien (4.5 hsien). This body of data confirmed the general picture of the farm survey, but varied irregularly in specific results,
1. All farmers in NingShu live in villages; farm families and village families are equivalent terms.

― 30 ―

even within itself. Since the data consisted only of estimates on behalf of a community, they are of less value than the more precise individual report of each farm family secured on the spot. We have therefore not employed the village data in our general listing and reports.
But on one point the village data throw light Secured in no other way. They give an estimate of the number of whole families which migrated and had not returned; while the farm survey could touch only those whole families or parts of families actually found in the farm villages. Thus they indicate a possible supplement or correction to our farm survey figures on estimate of population, migration, losses, labor supply, and death rate. We do not feel that our detailed figures from village estimates justify printing, but the best inference we can make from them is that only 70 per cent of the original families were actually present in March. Comparison of this with the individual farmer’s reports that 11 per cent of their family members were absent, suggests that migration under war conditions was usually by whole families, a result confirmed by the city survey and most remarkably by the practical coincidence of reports from the 1931 flood. 1
It is possible that some of the supposed 30 per cent of migrant families still remained within the hsiens studied, but in remote hilly sections not adequately reached by investigators, though the samples obtained covered the ground fairly well. It seems justifiable to assume that the estimates of losses for the area studied need not be modified by consideration of the family migration, for they are calculated upon the average loss per family studied, times the original number of families. Common observation in city and country alike is that absent families suffered in general more grievous losses than those watchful on the spot; whether by burning or by looting. This disparity was offset only in part by the sometimes successful removal of animals and a limited amount of portable property along with the migrating family; and moreover, most of the losses here recorded were of possessions not easily moved in practice.
If the figures of 30 per cent could be relied upon, it would in Table 23 increase the number of people left and not returned to a total of 496,590 (41 per cent of the estimated total original population of 1,211,200) ; and would increase the actual shortage of laborers enormously (62,000 families with an apparent average of 2.8 laborers in each, removing a figure of 173,600 laborers from the 447,400 mentioned in the Table as present in March) ; but would increase the expected shortage of laborers by a lesser figure, unknown because there is no report of intention to return.
The figures for deaths (‘Table 25) are all in terms of rates for families reporting, and therefore are not subject to change unless we assume that the presumed 30 per cent of families suffered an incidence of death greater or less than did the resident majority. Probably some families who migrated early and to a considerable distance or to the relatively safer portions of Nanking, fared better than the rest. On the other hand, the reason why some families migrated and did not return was simply because they or their accompanying neighbors had already experienced military murder and wounding and burning.
1. “Forty per cent of all people had to leave their homes, thirty-one per cent as families and nine per cent as individuals. ” The 1931 Flood in China, p. 27.

― 31 ―

(City Survey)
File number _________________
1. Name of family head________________
2. Present address: (a)_________ (b)____________
3. Former address:_______________________
4. Name of investigator:_______________
5. Date of investigation_____________________
6. Total family member__________________ (Include all members sharing in same economic support)

to head
Age Former
occupa-   tion 
occupa-  tion
             Killed or wounded              
 Date Killed  wounded Circum- stance


 Accident   Warfare
3. etc.

*”Accident” was used as a code word to record effect of military operation; “warfare” was a code word for violence by
Japanese soldiers apart form military operation.

7. Losses

Item Number  or  amount           


Original  total  value           


Total  value  lost           


Total  value  left           


Cause of loss
Fire Looting* Stealing
1.Building          a)Owued


 address:          b)Rented   chien
  2. Machinery or parts   pieces
  3. Shop equipment    “
  4. Material for manufacture     
5. Goods for sale      
  6. Rickshas    pieces
  7. Household furniture   “
  8. Bedding and clothing   “
  9. Food supplies       
  10. Bicycles    pieces
  11. Others      

“Looting” was used specifically to record robbery by Japanese
soldiers. All other robbery is listed under “Stealing”.

8. Migration

Relation to head Age Out In
Before Dec. 13 After Dec. 13 Returned Before Dec. 13 After Dec. 13 Returned
Yes No Yes No
  3. etc.

9. Sources of cereals last week: 
 (a) Rice____________________
 c) Price of rice ____________________
(d) Price of flour___________________

(City Survey)
File number _______________________
1. Building ____________________
2. Name of investigator : ________________________
3. Date of investigation ____________________________
4. Name of street:
(a) Owned ____________________________
Other address, if any________________________________
(b) Rented ___________________________
Other address, if any________________________________5. Building loss

Type of  building

Resi-  dence


Fac-  tory

Go-  down

Number  of 
build-  ings  (tso)

Number  of 


Number  of  fang

Unit  value

Minimum  estimated  value of  losses

Maximum  estimated  value of  losses

Rein-  forced  con-  crete

Mortised  bricks  filled  with  rubble




6. Loss of contents

Items Original 
Cause of Loss Remarks
Fire Accident* Looting* Stealing
   1. Machinery or parts 
   2. Shop equipment
   3. Material for manufactures
   4. Goods for sale
   5. Rickshas
   6. Furniture
   7. Bedding and clothing
   8. Food supplies
   9. Bicycles
   10. Cash, etc.

* See notes on these headings, Family Investigation.
7.  Number of persons now living in buildings______________________________________
     Number of persons formerly living in buildings___________________________________
     Number of persons now  employed___________________________________________
     Number of persons formerly employed_________________________________________



1. ___________Village ,__________Hsiang____________District,_______________Hsien. 
2. Date of information:________________year_______________month_______________day.
3. Investigator: Name_____________________ Address:____________________
4. Total number of persons in family (Babies included. Do not include persons
not now living with the family.)_____________________
5. Area planted _________________(mow)
Area owned__________________(mow) 
Area rented________________(mow)

6. Winter crops

Name of
of mow
in each
Number of
mow of each
crop com-
Per cent of a 
normal (plentiful
  year) crop ex-
pected (including
crops not destroy-
  ed or partly
  1. Wheat
  2. Barley
  3. Rape
  4. Broad beans
  5. Field peas
  6. Others

7. Changes of kind and area for spring and summer crops

Name of
Number of
 more usually
this year
  1. Rice
  2. Cotton
  3. Soybeans
  4. Corn
  5. Others

8. Seed needed for crops to be planted this year. (If the farmers has the money to buy the seed, and the seed is available locally, do not include in this table.)

Name of
Number of ton of
seed lacking
If had money, could
you buy locally?
  1. Rice
  2. Corn
  3. Soybean
  4. Cotton seed
  5. Others

9. Losses

Kind Number



1. Water buffaloes  

2. Oxen

3. Donkeys
  Stored  grain 4. Wheat


5. Barley
6. Rice
7. Corn
8. Soybeans
  Im-  ple-  ments 11. Plows
12. Harrows
13. Pumps
14. Hoes

10. Greatest needs (If the farmer has the money to buy the item, and the item is locally, do not include in this table.)

Kind Ton
  1. Wheat 
  2. Barley
  3. Rice
  4. Corn
  5. Soybean

11. Original number of chien of buildings, total____________
Number of chien destroyed completely, total____________partly, total________________

12. Deaths during the hostilities.

ship to


Cause of death



 (with ex-


13. Number of persons who migrated at time of hostilities and have not yet returned________________________

14. Laborers:  (1) Number of Laborers last spring______________________
(2) Number of laborers now _____________________
(3) Number of laborers expected to return for spring cultivation___________________

15. Number of mow made unfit for cultivation because of the hostilities _________________________


Urban Survey: Table 1 to 16

Rural Survey: Table 17 to 32 


Table 1


By section of city

Section Number  of  families  studied           



Total  family  members  in families  studied          




Average  size  of  family           



Estimated  total  number of  families           



Estimated  total  family  members           



  A. Inside of wall     906     4,252     4.7   45,300     212,600    
  1. Safety Zone     208     1,358     4.6   14,900     67,900    
  2. Refugee Camps     114     550     4.8   5,700     27,500    
  3. Cheng Hsi     115     544     4.7   5,750     27,200    
  4. Cheng Tung     55     232     4.2   2,750     11,600    
  5. Cheng Pel     51     243     4.8   2,550     12,150    
  6. Men Hsi     126     631     5.0   6,300     31,500    
  7. Men Tung     103     451     4.4   5,150     22,600    
  8. Garden     44     243     5.5   2,200     12,150    
  B. Outside of wall     43     171     4.0   2,150     8,550    
  9. Hsiakwan     13     46     3.5   650     2,300    
  10. Chunghwamen     16     79     4.9   800     3,950    
  11. Shuihsimen     14     46     3.3   700     2,300    
  All Section   949   4,423   4.7   47,450   221,150*

        *On th basis of incomplete registration carried out by the military authorities between the end of December and the end of January, members of the international Committee estimated the population of Nanking at that time to approach 250,000, a figure decidedly above their deliberately cautions guesses of earlier weeks. Semi-official Chinese conjectures ran closer to 300.000.  There was no great change in February and March, but a noticeable inflow from less orderly areas the city probably built up a small surplus over departures, which also were visibly significant. We venture an estimate of 250,000 to 270,000 in late March, some of whom were inaccessible to the investigators, and some of whom were passed by; 221,150 are represented in the survey. On May 31, the residents registered in the five district offices of the municipal government (including Hsiakwan, but apparently no other sections outside the gates), numbered 277,000. This figure is admittedly incomplete, particularly as to women and children, and is commonly amended to nearer 400,000. One year ago the population of the Nanking Municipality was just over 1,000,000, a figure sharply reduced in August and September, rising again to nearly November, The old Municipality included a larger area than is now considered, comprising at one-tenth more in population.

Table 2

Age group Per cent in each age group Sex ratio*
1938, All
1932** Present  study 
Male Female Male  and 
Male Female Male 
and female

0–  4

5–  9











60 and over


















































































































 0 —14


50 and over


































     *Number of males per 100 females.
    **The date for 1932 are from the same study as the 2.027 families referred to in Table 3, but only for 1.756 families.

Table 3
By section of the city, shown in percentage

Section Type of Family
Normal Broken Non-family Normal
with relatives
Broken with
Non-family with
per cent
in eachsection
Wife, rela-tives
Man, chil-dren,
A. Inside of City
1. Safety Zone
2. Refugee Camps
3. Chen Hsi
4. Chen Tung
5. Men Pei
6. Men Hsi
7. Men Tung
8. GardenB. Outside of city*
9. Hsiakwan
10. Chunghwamen
11. Shuihsimen












All Sections, 1938 4.4 26.2 2.6 6.5 5.3 2.1 5.0 27.3 5.9 6.3 6.2 2.1 100.0
Nanking, 1932** 9.5 33.1 2.3 3.4 5.3 2.1 4.1 25.7 4.6 2.6 7.1 0.1 100.0

     *The number of cases studied in each area outside of the city wall was too small to make the percentage distribution very significant but for the areas combined the sample is comparable with sections in the city.
    **A study of 2,027 families in sections of Nanking and class of people from which present population largely came.




Deaths by Injuries by Taken
Per cent
killed and
injured by
Unknown Military
Before Dec. 12 600 50 650
Dec. 12, 13 50 250 250 200 550 91
Dec. 14-Jan. 13 2,000 150 2,200 200 3,700 4,550 92
Jan. 14-Mar. 15 250
Date unknown 200 150 600 50 50 1,000 75
Total 850 2,400 150 50 3,050 250 4,200 6,750 81
Per cent of cases
of violence oc-
curring after
Dec. 13th
   89       90            

 *By “military operation” is meant bombing, shelling, or bullets fired in battle.
**Most of those “taken Away” have not been heard from in any manner.


shown in percentages

Age group Death of Injuries of Taken
Per cent
males in
killed and
Males by Females by Males by Females by
Others* Soldiers’
Others* Soldiers’
Others* Soldiers’
Under 5 years
5-14 6 8 8 8 50
15-29 25 25 23 44 80 65 55 61
30-44 22 8 15 14 35 20 11 50 36 76
45-59 19 42 15 57 15 8 9 68
60 and over 28 17 39 29 6 8 50 58
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Number per
1,000 in family
members re-
8 3 3 2 8 1 6 0.5 19
Number of
1,800 600 650 350 1,700 250 1,300 100 4,200

 *””Others” includes both by “Military Operation” and “Unknown” as shown in Table 4.
**A total of 221,150 persons. See Table 1.

Occupation Number Per cent of all
persons employed
Averagedaily earnings perpersonemployed



Males Females Total
Agriculture, mining 5,500 100 5,600  10  0.73
9,650 800 10,450 18 1.08
Trade 18,200 1,700 19,900 34 1.20
Transportation 3,550 100 3,650 6 1.14
Clerical occupations 900 900 2 0.86
Domestic and personalservice 6,000 700 6,700 12 0.96
Public service not elsewhere classified 1,800 100 1,900 3 1.03
Professional service 1,600 150 1,750 3 1.05
General labor* 3,050 1,150 4,200 7 0.34
Combined shops* 2,700 150 2,850 5 0.91
Total and averages 52,950 4,950 57,900 100 1.01
Per cent of total population
Per cent of persons 10 years and
over employed
Per cent of persons 15 years and
over employed

    *This classification follows the main groupings of the United States Census, adapted for local use by dropping the two groups of forestry and fishing, and extraction of minerals (the one miner reported was
added to the single extractive group of agriculture); and by adding the two groups general labor and combined shops. “Combined shops” refer to the common case of shops that both make and sell, and therefore do not fall into manufacture or into trade.  

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Fabrication film by Frank Capra

↓a fabrication film by Frank Capra.

November 20, 2008

Truth of Comfort Women – Explanation –

Truth of Comfort Women

– Explanation –



By Han’nichi seiryoku gekitaiyou html-ban siryoukan (反日勢力撃退用・html版資料館)

Survivors of Japan’s Military  Sexual Slavery who Claim  Compensation since the WWⅡ The documents of  the Imperial Japanese Army involvement
1.Background and development of the Comfort Women Issue
2.Verification of the controversies over the Comfort Women
3.Japanese made the Issue on comfort women into huge problem

Background and development of the Comfort Women IssueExamine the comfort women disputes through the mail magazine called“Japan on the Globe”

Masaomi Ise, an editor and publisher of “Japan on the Globe”  “Comfort Women” problem(first part)September 25, 1999
1.U.S. Military information department reported the reality of the comfort
  United States Government reported a Japanese Army comfort place in Myitkyina,
  North Burma after the WWII as following.

  The report says 1) Comfort women’s parents were usually indebted as much as Yen300 to Yen1000. But comparing with Yen1000 to Yen2000 what they earned par a month, it could be stated that their parents’ debt was as little as Yen300 to Yen1000. Their clients’ monthly salaries were only around Yen15 to Yen25 {*1} in that period. 2) Their share within what they earned was around 40% to 60%. 3) They were able to choose the clients and to decline servicing to whom they do not like. 4) They lived in fairly good housing conditions. 5) They could leave the place for Korea as long as they made repayments for the debts. {*2}

Mun Ok-Sun(文玉珠)is an ex-comfort woman of a brothel at Rangoon, Burma.

Her comments jibe with what United States Government reported.

  “One-day, I went to shopping at a market in China town. I bought an alligator skinned handbag for myself, and some other things for my mother as well.  Riding on an officer’s jeep with officers, I went to Pegu (Bago) to see
  Buddha statue. There, I prayed good fortune for Yamada Ichiro (Japanese
  soldier, her boy friend) and my mother in Korea.” {*3} 

  In 1992, Mun Ok-Sun(文玉珠) claimed to withdraw her postal saving that was the money she earned and deposited during 3 years of service in Rangoon, Burma. The amount she claimed was Yen26,145. In those days, one could have bought a nice house for Yen1000.

  In addition, visited Japan in 1993, and made a lawsuit against the post office to return her saving of 26,145 yen, the money she saved while she was a comfort woman. She lost in the lawsuit, but saving this much of money during that time is simply amazing. She wrote that 1,000 yen would buy a small house in her hometown.

  This means within three years this woman made equivalent of today’s 40,000,000 -50,000,000 yen. {*4}

Maybe the terms such as “sexual slave” and ”forced prostitution” are both quite misnomers for describing a comfort woman.

The word “comfort women” is often referred as the women kidnapped by Japanese military, no freedom, no salary, and just raped by Japanese soldiers. However, in this report by U.S. military and other writings, comfort women are described in totally different way from what the majority believes. The question is “which is true?”

{*1}秦郁彦 「慰安婦の戦場の性」 新潮選書 1999/6 270頁Ikuhiko_Hata “Nature of Comfort Women in the Battle Filed” shinchousensho(Publisher) June,1999 P,270
{*2}秦郁彦 「慰安婦の戦場の性」 新潮選書 1999/6 275頁Ikuhiko_Hata “Nature of Comfort Women in the Battle Filed” shinchousensho(Publisher)  June,1999  P,275  Reference) “UNITED STATES OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION: Psychological Warfare Team. Attached to U.S. Army Forces India-Burma Theater APO 689”  National Archives and Records Administration
{*3}秦郁彦 「慰安婦の戦場の性」 新潮選書 1999/6 276頁Ikuhiko_Hata “Nature of Comfort Women in the Battle Filed” shinchousensho (Publisher) June,1999 P,276
{*4}西岡力 「闇に挑む!」 徳間文庫 1998/9 301頁Tsutomu_Nishioka “Challenge the Darkness!” Tokumabunko (Publisher) September,1998 P,301

Mun Ok-Sun(文玉珠) and 26,145 yen of savings

Mainichi Newspaper(毎日新聞) May 22, 1992
  Mun Ok-Sun (68), a Korean woman who used to be a comfort woman during the World War II in Myanmar (former Burma), and she has been demanding the returning of her savings made during the war. May 11, 1992 she found the original book of the saving was maintained in Shimonoseki post office in Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi prefecture. She is now demanding the return of her savings, since savings was made while she was still a Japanese citizen. According the transaction record of the book, she put money in her account for twelve times from June 1943 to September 1945, and the balance is 26,145 yen.

Below is the basic the military personnel’s salaries; Comparing to these
figures, the amount of savings of Mun Ok-Sun(文玉珠)is obviously huge.

Showa-History Research Group Report December, 1999(昭和史研究所会報1999年12月号)
Annual salary of Japanese Military personnel by rank
General 6600yen
Lieut. General 5800yen
Maj. General 5000yen
Colonel 4440~3720yen
Lieut. Colonel 3720~2640yen
Major 2640~2040yen
Captain 1860~1470yen
Lieutenant 1130~1020yen
Second Lieut. 850yen
Monthly salary
Master sergeant 75~32yen
Sergeant 32~23yen
Corporal 20yen
Corporal-2 13.5yen
Private First class 10.5yen
Junior technician 9yen
Buck private 9~6yen

2. How the issue on comfort women was brought to pass.
  Take a look at the disputes of comfort women in chronological order:

1) Seiji Yoshida originally started the comfort woman problem in his book called “Confessing war crimes and Korean people abducted” published in 1983. According to his book, he abducted some Korean women for comfort women as Women’s Teishintai (Volunteer Corps) in 1943. The Asahi Newspaper made a comfort women campaign from 1991 to 1992 as many as four times.
2) On August 11, 1991, The Asahi Newspaper had reported that it had found an ex-comfort woman who had been taken to the battlefield as a member of Women’s Teishintai and engaged in comfort services.
3) On January 11, 1992, The Asahi News paper reported that it had found an evidence of comfort women operation supervised by the military, which instructed to install and manage it. Prime Minister Miyazawa who had visited South Korea on the 16th of the same month. And he bore the brunt of the blame for the newspaper article. He was asked to apologize as many as eight times during his visit and gave an intimation of further investigation.
4) On August 4, 1993, Chief secretary Kono made an announcement that Japanese Government admitted the existence of abductions, compulsions and the authority’s involvement for operating of comfort stations during the WWII.

The discourse of Yohei Kono, Chief Cabinet Secretary meant that Japanese Government admitted the military involvement in coercing of comfort women. This brought about history textbooks revision. The comfort women were depicted for the Japanese high school students’ textbooks.

  Today, more intensive research on this issue has shown whether those reports were made based on facts. In next paragraph, I would like to verify those 4 reports in detail.

Verification of the controversies over the Comfort Women

Masaomi Ise, an editor and publisher of “Japan on the Globe”  “Comfort Women” problem(first part)September 25, 1999
3. Comfort women hunted by Seiji Yoshida
Verification of 1) Seiji Yoshida’s confession  The sexual slave hunting conducted by Seiji Yoshida in South Korea is described in his book as follows:

  One Japanese soldier shouted to a young big woman in a factory to proceed. She was so scary that she clung to an aged woman nearby. The soldier dragged her out by the arm. All the women in the factory started to scream. The wooden sword flailed her by the shoulders and hips because she resisted. As many as 16 women were abducted.

  Like British navy did, Imperial Japanese Military had an organized private comfort house in order to prevent rape of local women. As a squadron was moved to the front line, the comfort house went along with. So it was reasonable that the military supervised running of the brothels including designating of business owners and locations. This is just an extension of the regulated prostitution system into the front.

The point of the argument is whether the military conducted the systematic abduction of women. It would be a serious state crime if the Imperial Japanese Military conducted abductions and compulsive prostitution such as Seiji Yoshida asserts

4. Cheap commercial enthusiasm
According to Seiji Yoshida, the abductions by Japanese soldiers were done at a shellfish button factory in a village named Sonsanpo of Chejudo Island. Ho Yon-son(許栄善), the reporter of the Cheju newspaper investigated and concluded there were no such a thing took placeCheung Oc-tane, 85 years old women, who has been a resident in the island for her entire life pledges that every islander would have noticed right off the bat if as many as 15 women were taken away, because there were only 250 families in the island.Kim Pok-Tong(金奉玉), the local historian of the island also declares the abductions Yoshida described were untrue. He had been continuing the research since the book published in 1983. He believes that Yoshida wrote the false book in order to make it controversial and make some money out of it.  Ikuhiko Hata(秦郁彦), the professor of Nihon University visited the island and had been asked why Seiji Yoshida wrote a spurious book by Ho Yon-son(許栄善). This question left him agape. {*5}The Asahi Newspaper hunted down the timing of Prime Minister Miyazawa’s visited to South Korea, and it put recurring articles of faithless abductions as many as four times in a single year, although it had remained in abeyance since Professor Hata’s visit and research. Yoshiaki Yoshimi, the professor of Chuo University, who advocates strongly the crimes of Imperial Japanese Military, does not feel very vindicated in Seiji Yoshida’s book.
  Ikuhiko_Hata(秦 郁彦) 
Born in Yamaguchi prefecture on December 12, 1932.He started his carrier at the Ministry of Finance in 1956 and served as an instructor of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Japan, Defense Agency. Lecturer of National Defense Academy in Japan.From 1971 to 1976, Director of Historical Studies Office in the Ministry of Finance (財政史室室長). Secretariat for the Finance Minister.Guest professor at Princeton university. Professor of department of Politics and Economies at Takushoku University(拓殖大学). Professor of Chiba University (千葉大学). Professor of department of law at Nihon University (日本大学).After retirement in 2003, he works as a lecturer in Nihon University.
He majored in history of warfare mainly on modern Japanese history and World War II. When he was a Tokyo university student, he conducted hearings with Japanese commissioned officers of WWⅡincluding category-A war criminals. He is known as a historian who attaches a high value to subjective and positive analysis. As a financial official, he participated in a collaborative project promoted by “Nihon Kokusai Seijigakkai Taiheiyosenso Geninkyumeibu(日本国際政治学会太平洋戦争原因究明部)”. As the result, this works led the issue of “the way to the Pacific War (Taiheiyo Senso heno miti:太平洋戦争への道)”, a definitive book of the diplomatic history of outbreak of the war.As the Director of Historical Studies Office (財政史室長) in the Ministry of Finance, he was engaged in editing financial records under the U.S. Occupation. He is also known for editing many subject-books about modern history. “Comprehensive Dictionary of Imperial Japanese Army and Navy(Nipon Rikukaigun sogojiten: 日本陸海軍総合事典)” published by University of Tokyo Press is a book of ultimate authority.He also turned state’s evidence in the Ienaga-Textbook suit.
  Following the works by Akira Nakamura (中村粲), an emeritus professor at Dokkyo University (獨協大学), Yoshiaki Itakura (板倉由明), an expert of the history of warfare, and Chitoshi Uesugi (上杉千年), a history textbook researcher, he exposed the frauds in “My war crimes/Record of abduction of Korean(Watashino sensou hanzai/Chosenjin kyouseirenkou nokiroku:私の戦争犯罪・朝鮮人連行強制記録)” written by Yoshida_Seiji(吉田清治) by on-the-spot coverage{*6} 

5. Coming out of ex-comfort women
Verification of 2) the ex-comfort woman on Asahi Newspaper  The Asahi Newspaper on August 11, 1991 ran a hoopla at the top of the front page titled “I cannot help bursting into tears every time I recall” “Former Korean comfort woman finally tells her story after half a century”. The article stated that “a woman who forced to work as a member of Women’s Teishintai (Volunteer Corps) during the war was discovered”, and that “former Korean comfort woman who was forced to work as a prostitute finally came out.” {*7}  This article was proved to be totally untrue 3 days later. On Aug. 14, the former Korean comfort woman, Kim Hak-Sun (金学順), herself in a press conference refuted and elucidated. ” I had never been a member of the Women’s Teishin Tai, and I had never been taken by force” to the reporters. A Korean newspaper reported her story as follows:

Her family was poor, and they became desperate. Her mother sold her to a Gisaeng house at the age of 14. After she learned to be a Gisaeng for three years, her adopted father** who was the owner of the Gisaeng house told her that he would help her by finding a job. She was taken to a place that served a troop of about 300 Japanese soldiers in Northern China.  The Hankyoreh(ハンギョレ新聞)August 15, 1991* Gisaeung (妓生) = Korean traditional prostitute** It was common I Korea that girls sold to Gisaeung house were adopted by the owner.

Therefore, she was sold by her own mother and by her adopted father of the Gisaeng house to a prostitution dealer for the military.

Her story was nothing to do with organized or forced recruitment by the government at all. “Women’s Teishintai” (Women’s volunteer corps) was first established at a Cabinet meeting on September 1943. It has not existed in 1939 when Kim Hak-Sun (金学順) was 17 years old. Besides, “Women’s Teishintai” was different from so-called “Ianfu” the comfort women. During the war, young female laborers were drafted because males were drafted as soldiers. “Women’s Teishintai” were drafted in order to supplement the lack of laborers.

Unfortunately, the term “Jugun Ianfu (military comfort women)” did not exist at that time even thought the term is widely used in recent years.

“Jugun Ianfu” is just a coined word. The word “Jugun” is used like:

“Jugun Kangofu” Nurses attached to the army belonged to the military;

“Jugun Kisha” War correspondents;

“Jugun Sou” Priests attached to certain troops.

These are the social positions assured by the statute. They were assigned to specific troops.

On the other hand, local pimps hired comfort women, and there was no direct relation with the military. “Military comfort women” is a made up term. It was probably made up in association with “front nurses” and “war correspondents”. It was designed to trick people to believe that the comfort women belonged to certain troops.

After the discovery, Kim Hak-Sun (金学順) became one of the plaintiffs of the suit against Japanese government. One of the organizations that support her is the “Pacific War Victim Bereaved”. Reporter Makimura (槙村) who wrote this phony article for the Asahi Newspaper is married to the daughter of the director of the organization. Of course, he is proficient in Korean as well, and he must have very well understood what Kim Hak-Sun meant.

  This reporter did not mention that Kim Hak-Sun had been sold. The article indicating, “she was taken to work as Women’s Teishintai ” is an intentional fabrication by reporter Makimura. He did not even bother to write an article to set the record straight.

  Kim Hak-Sun(金学順)   She was born in Jilin Province (吉林省) of Manchuria (満州), in 1923. She
  is the first Korean who declared herself a victim of the comfort woman
  on August 14, 1991. In the press conference in Korea, she testified that
  she had been sold by her adapted father. On December 16, 1991, she filed
  an action against Japanese government to ask for apology and compensation.
  Kim Hak-Sun’s complaint  
  In 1923, she was born in Jilin Province(吉林省)of Manchuria(満州), northern China. However, soon after this, she was back to Pyongyang(平壌) because of death of her father. Her mother worked as a housekeeper though, her family was poor. She dropped out of 4th grade elementary school. She was adopted by Kim Tae-Won (金泰元) and had Gisaeng (妓生) training for 3 years from age of 14 {*8}. In 1939, she had been convinced that she could earn money, she went to
  China with her adopted father and Emiko (エミ子), her one year older sister
  (also adopted by the owner).
  She went to a small village named Tiebizhen (鉄壁鎮) via Beijing (北京), and her father left her to a brothel in the village. Then she was forced prostitution for Japanese soldiers. There were periodical health checks by army doctors. In spring of the same year, she escaped from the brothels with the help of Cho Won-Jang(趙元チャン), a Korean merchant. She got married with him in Shanghai after moving from place to place. They lived in French settlement as a pawnbroker dealing with Chinese and had 2 sons. In the following year of war end, they went back to Korea. During Korean War, her husband died of an accident and her sons died of disease. She spent time moving place to place in Korea and started drinking and smoking. Having no place to go, she is on welfare. She says her misfortune started from being forced to be a comfort woman. Japanese government should acknowledge the wartime wrongdoings and apologize.

*Her claim was the compensation for “the misfortune in her life” and
stated that she had been sold by her adopted father. However, she later
switched her statement that she was kidnapped by Japanese army.

6. Were there any comfort women actually abducted by the military?
“Korean council for women drafted for military sexual slavery by Japan (Teishintai issue council)” deals with the comfort woman problem in Korea. Fifty-five former comfort women are registered for the council. The council interviewed just over 40 of them, and conducted the logical evaluations. As a result, 19 of them are chosen because of their reliability, and the council published a collection of the testimonies. Then, their testimony was verified logically. Nine among them stated that they were taken forcefully; however, only four were considered as reliable enough to include in the book. Further, two of them told that they had worked as comfort women in Toyama (Japan) and Pusan (Korea). However, neither of these locations was the war front. No troops, no brothels.  The remaining reliable witnesses are Kim Hak-Sun (金学順) and the aforementioned Mun Ok-Sun (文玉珠) who saved up around 40 to 50 million yen (about four to five hundred thousand dollars); However, neither of them stated in the book that they were taken forcefully.  After all, none of the believable testimony gathered by the Korean investigation proved that they were taken by force as “military comfort women.” {*10}
7. About military involvement
Verification of 3) the evidence of the military involvementNext, let us look at an article by the Asahi Newspaper regarding evidence of “the military involvement in the comfort stations”. This article was published just before the Prime Minister Miyazawa visited Korea. As a result, the Prime Minister made an official apology. The uncovered document was titled “regarding military comfort stations and the recruitment of female employees” which was issued in 1938 by the Department of the Army.Contents of the document:When the local prostitution business tried to recruit comfort women, the following problems aroused:1) Local businesses wrongfully referred as “Military Approved”.2) Unruly recruitment methods using war correspondents and visitors to the front.3) Many businesses used unlawful recruitment methods that were reported to the police.  We strongly advice not to cause such problems. Utmost care should be taken when you choose the business. Also, keep close contact with the local military police force. {*11}Therefore, “the military involvement” was the military’s warning. The military was trying to stop the forced draft by the crooked local businesses with the help of the local police force.  The Asahi Newspaper re-posted the content of the document. It was a front-page article titled “official document showing the military involvement of the comfort stations”, and ” control/monitor the setup/recruitment to the troops”. The following was in the article:

  Military Comfort Women: During 1930s, many Japanese soldiers committed
  random sexual violence toward women in China. In order to prevent the local
  anti-Japanese feeling and venereal diseases, the comfort stations were
  established. According to the ex-soldiers and army doctors, about 80% were
  Korean women since the opening of the stations. After the break out of
  the Pacific War, mostly Korean women were forcefully taken as “Teishintai
  (volunteer corps”. Estimated ranges were between 80,000 and 200,000.

After reading this document and the false description, most readers think that the Japanese military was involved in the forced draft. What a clever trick it was.

  This article had a tremendous effect because it was published just 5 days
  before Prime Minister Miyazawa’s visit to South Korea as if it was intended
  for that purpose. People in Seoul protested, and a demonstration was organized.
  Opposition meetings took place one after another and the Japanese flags
  were burned. Without verifying the truthfulness of the article, the Prime
  Minister Miyazawa could not help apologizing to President Roh Tae-Woo no
  less than eight times.

*Probably, many people from both Europe and United States will have hard
time understanding why Miyazawa apologized before the verification of the
In the Western world “apology” means action taken after admitting its fault.On the other hand, in Japan “apology” is use to help other to calm down and avoid the conflict, and apologizing does not necessary means that one have admitted its fault.For example, in Japanese train (been packed all the time) when a person steps on other person both side immediately apologies, and this is to prevent occurring of the conflict.The action Miyazawa has taken was very the “Japanese style apology to calm down people’s emotion”.The alleged evidence of drafting of women

Matters regarding recruitment at military comfort station
English translation
 Title: “Matters regarding recruitment at military comfort station”
 <Notification>From: AssistantTo: Army Chief Generals of the troops in northern China and of the expeditionary force in central ChinaWhen brokers recruited comfort women for establishment of the brothels during Sino-Japanese war, there were not a few infamous cases to which we need to pay attention: the case that some brokers used the authority of Japanese military for their recruitment, as the result, they ruined Japanese military’s credibility and led to a misunderstanding of ordinary people, the case that some brokers took unruly method of recruiting through embedded journalists and visitors causing social problem, the case that some brokers were arrested and placed under investigation because the way of their recruiting was like kidnapping. From now, as regards the recruitment of comfort women, the expeditionary force properly chooses and controls brokers which recruit comfort women. Also, it is necessary to cooperate with military polices and law enforcement authorities. To keep the prestige of Japanese military and to consider social problems, take careful note of no omission.March 4, 1938
{*5} 秦郁彦 「慰安婦の戦場の性」 新潮選書 1999/6 323頁Ikuhiko_hata “Nature of Comfort Women in the Battle Filed” Shinchousensho(Publisher) June,1999 P,323
{*6} 「諸君」 1992年7月号・1992年8月号。「週刊新潮」“ゴールデンウィーク特集号「従軍慰安婦強制連行 『虚偽レポート』の元凶」” 1996年5月2・9日  Reference1) Syokun(Monthly periodical) July, 1992 issue & August, 1992 issue  Reference2) “principal source of false report, carting off comfort women” Shuukanshinchou(Weekly magazine) May 2・9, 1996
{*7}西岡力 「闇に挑む!」 徳間文庫 1998/9 291頁Tsutomu_nishioka “Challenge the Darkness!” tokumabunko(Publisher) September,1998 P,291
{*8}Gisaeng = Traditional prostitute in Korea
{*9}京都新聞 1997年12月16日夕刊kyoutosinnbun(newspaper) December 16, 1997(The evening paper)
{*10}西岡力 「闇に挑む!」 徳間文庫 1998/9 275頁Tsutomu_nishioka “Challenge the Darkness!” tokumabunko(Publisher) September,1998 P,275
{*11}西岡力 「闇に挑む!」 徳間文庫 1998/9 267頁Tsutomu_nishioka “Challenge the Darkness!” tokumabunko(Publisher) September,1998 P,267

Japanese made the Issue on comfort women into huge problem

Masaomi Ise, an editor and publisher of “Japan on the Globe”  “Comfort Women” problem(Latter part)October 2, 1999
1. No documents showing the forced recruits was found
Prime Minister Miyazawa promised to conduct the investigation to the President Roh Tae-Woo. On August 4, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet Kono announced the results of the government investigation that there were many incidents of kidnapping and forced recruit, and that in some cases, there was a direct involvement of government officials.  Therefore, the existent of forced recruit became the official government opinion. For this announcement, the government not only extensively investigated the official documents, but also interviewed former comfort women. The US military reports that I quoted earlier were discovered during this investigation. Then, why did the government conclude that there had been direct involvement by government officials? The head of the politics deliberation room, Hirabayashi Hiroshi, conducted this investigation. On Jan. 30, 1997, he was asked by Congressman Katayama Toranosuke (of the Liberal Democratic Party) at the House of Councilors budget committee. He gave the following answer:

  The government investigated twice. Some materials and testimonies were found. As far as the “forced recruit” problem that you indicated, we did not find any documents indicating the forced recruit of comfort women by the military nor the government officials. However, after comprehensive study, we concluded that some forced element existed. Therefore, we made that announcement. {*12} 
2. Results after the comprehensive study
  They concluded after the comprehensive study that the forced recruitment
  had existed even though they did not find any documents supporting their
  conclusion. How come they reached such a conclusion? Mr. Ishihara Nobuo
  who was the vice-chief of the cabinet secretariat gave the following explanation:

  We did not find the evidence. We tried to find the individual who forcefully recruited comfort women, but we were unsuccessful. After all, we judged from the testimonies of 16 former Korean comfort women. The South Korean officials urged us to ” recognize their testimonies
  for their honor.” There were neither convincible evidence nor testimonies,
  but we cannot help recognizing the “forcefulness” of recruits.
  However, we never would have admitted if they were asking for compensation from Japan. In that case, we will ask for evidence from the careful investigation just like the regular court trials. We admitted it as a good will gesture after taking the relationship with Korea into consideration.  We were criticized for admitting the “forcefulness” only from the testimonies of the former comfort women. We are well aware of that, and ready to be criticized. We do not make any excuses after the decision.” {*13}

The testimonies were not only heard in private but also unsubstantiated. However, the government officials admitted the “forcefulness” without sufficient evidence or testimony because of strong pleas from South Korean officials.

The hearing ended on July 30. Kono’s announcement was on Aug. 4, only five days after the end of the hearing. On the same day, all members of the Miyazawa administration resigned.

3. Japanese media had created anti-Japanese emotion among Korean
  About the Korean Government’s strong request, at the meeting with other
  Diet members, Mr. Ishihara said,

“It did not seemed to me that Korean Government was interested in talking about comfort women issue. They had no earthly ideas to put this issue on the table at the beginning. It had been so until one Japanese lawyer incited the issue among the Korean people. He was quite a successful instigator, and both Korean Congress & Government were forced to pay heed to the issue in a sharp about-face.”  For first several years Korean government never fanned this problem, rather they did not want to bring this issue on the table. However, certain person in Japan went to different places and increased public attention to this problem, this person also influenced Japanese government to bring this topic to the congress. From all these effort comfort women became quite a problem, and at this point Korean government could no longer ignore this problem.{*14}

Mr. Ishihara remains the name of the Japanese lawyer as anonymous.

The former Korean President Roh Tae-Woo (盧泰愚), also acknowledges that Japanese media had originally provoked the comfort women issue. He said, “It also ”

  “Japanese mass-media has created the Korean people’s wrath against Japanese people.” {*15} 
No Tae-woo(盧泰愚)   He was born in Daegu(大邱) on September 4, 1932. He was the 13th President of South Korea(1988―1993). With the outbreak of Korean war, he entered the army and worked as Secretary of airlift Special war brigade, Secretary of 9th Division and etc.  In 1981, he retired from the army. Ron made a speech on June 29, 1987 promising
  a wide program of reforms including democratic constitution and popular
  election of the president(6.29Democratization declaration). He won the
  election and became the country’s first democratically elected president.
  In 1995 after his retirement, his hidden political funds was uncovered.
  He was pursued his criminal responsibility for Gwangju massacre(光州事件)
  in which the government suppressed demos with weapons and served a jail
  sentence. In September of 1997, he was released from prison under an amnesty.

4. Japanese Lawyers also appeared in Indonesia
  Kenichi Takagi (高木健一), who leads the lawsuit against the Japanese Government for South Korean comfort women, in together with 2 other Japanese lawyers arrived in Indonesia in 1993. It was the last shoe to drop. They put an advertisement on local newspapers for ex-comfort women to be compensated. This brought about the comfort women problem in Indonesia. {*16}  Raharojo, the chairman of the society of former Indonesian assistant soldiers to Japanese Imperial Army (兵補協会) {*17}, who conducted a research for ex-comfort women, stated that the whole thing was delineated by Takagi. According to Shinzaburo Nakajima (中嶋慎三郎), representative of ASEAN, Raharojo pouted his lips and said that Japan should pay Yen 2,000,000- per an ex-comfort woman as compensation. In other words, it was announced that Yen 2,000,000- might be handed out to each Indonesian woman at once only if she admitted that she was an ex-comfort woman.Yen 2,000,000- was quite a big bonanza in Indonesia. With such amount of money, one can enjoy rest of life luxuriously without having a job. Over 22,000 women deluged the 3 Japanese lawyers with compensation. During WWII, only 20,000 Japanese soldiers were dispatched to Indonesia, however, 22,000 women proclaimed that they were all ex-comfort women.  Chukyo TV, one of Japanese local broadcasting stations reported this brouhaha titled as “IANFU: the comfort women in Indonesia”. Jamal Ali, the Chairman of Indonesia Times, who had witnessed this TV program, was piqued and commented to Nakajima as follows: {*18}

  “What a cockamamie it is! More than one Indonesian comfort women for one Japanese soldier? I am sure it is an oxymoron. This TV program is nothing but detrimental on Japanese-Indonesian relationship. Indonesians have been standing tall for not begging money from other nations including Dutch, which seized Indonesia for 360 years. ” {*19}
5. Tricks on the TV program
  On the TV program, there was one Indonesian ex-comfort woman, in her local Indonesian language, stated that “Korean had gone right after the war and all the comfort women were left unpaid”.The particular comfort station that she had served for during the war
  was run by a Korean operator, not by Japanese Imperial Army. However, the
  Japanese superimposition put on the film by the TV reporter went; “Japanese had left Indonesian comfort women unpaid”.
6. Indonesian government  – Please sort out this mess, Japanese people. –
  Indonesian Government promptly recognized that all those hoopla was unjust and could be negative for good relationship with Japan. It was initially considered done by Japanese Communist Party, which put a prior notice of the TV program on their bulletin paper. Inten Suweno, the Minister for Social Affairs of Indonesia had a press conference over the issue. His statement is as follows: {*20}

1)Government of Indonesia has never asked for compensations concerning for the issue.
2)There is no reason for Indonesian Government to decline Japanese Government ‘s monetary offer, however, the fund granted will not be paid to ex-comfort women. It will be used for improving the welfare of all the women in Indonesia.
3)It is a Government of Indonesia’s understanding that the war compensation by Japan had already settled at the agreement of 1958

  With the strong resistance by Indonesian government, the lawyer Takagi’s
  speculation was failed. After this press conference, several Indonesian
  government officials told Mr. Nakajima as following.

  “Japan was the one who brought this problem on comfort women, and this is really vicious action. This case shows that there are some groups intending to ruin the relationship between Japan and Indonesia through publicizing our shame and harming the honor of Indonesians. We will ask Japan to sort out this messy situation.”

7. Losing Public Attention
  Several investigations on the issue were done. No evidence of coercive
  sexual slavery conducted by Japanese Imperial Army was found. Proponents
  who deprecated the result of the investigations, therefore, conspired to
  restate the definition of “coercive”. Professor Yoshiaki Yoshimi of Chuo
  University said, “”

  If there are other options, none is willing to be a comfort woman. Even if it looks women’s own decision, actually the poverty and unemployment under Japanese occupation during the war forced those women coercively becoming comfort women. {*21}

  Based on his theory that widens the definition of “forced recruiting”,
  all prostitutes women on the streets nowadays are compulsively forced to
  do their business. Very few people supported Professor Yoshimi’s theory,
  and public interests on comfort women were lost quickly.

8. Proceedings in United Nations
Although the issue on comfort women was settled in Japan, accurate information did not quite spread worldwide. Using this uncertainty, attempts to scandalize the issue are still on going in the international community.On Feb 17th, 1992, Etsuro Totsuka (戸塚悦郎), a member of Bar Association of Japan, brought an indictment to United Nations Human Right Committee against Japanese Government for brushing aside the comfort women problems. It was just after the Prime Minister Miyazawa visited Korea.Mar 1996, Radhika Coomaraswamy Report was submitted to the Human Right Committee held in Geneva. Although her report mainly focused on the violence among family members, in its supplementary section, it also mentioned about expropriated women for sexual abuse by Japanese Military during WWII.Within the report, a folly statement of ex-comfort woman from North Korea, who claimed that she was expropriated at the age of 13 by Japanese Military, continues “One of my colleague, one day, complained that it was too much to make services more than 40 customers for a day to Commander Yamamoto. And she was tortured and killed by him. Moreover, he ordered me to chop the head off from the dead body, to boil and to serve it for him on a dish.” The woman who made this averment was born 1920. It was an ordinary period around in 1933 in Korea. There were no military comfort stations existed although there were some brothels run by private operators. Without such primitive verifications, three other zany, frothy and untrue statements were seen in the report.Although Mr. Totsuka, in cahoots with Mr. Shouji Motooka, a Japanese Diet member (former Socialist party, currently SDP) demonstrated in Geneva and lobbied the UN committee members against Japanese Government, they snapped their activities as the outpost of Ministry of Foreign affairs of Japan submitted the 40 pages of statement on absurd ex-comfort women’s avowals.  UN Human Rights Committee concluded that it “will take note” on comfort women issue, which is a parlance in UN means “disregard”. Most of representatives from all over the world supported the conclusion. None raised a hue and cry except those from South Korea, North Korea, PRC and Philippines. {*22}
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights
One of the functional commissions, which belonged to ECOSOC in the UN, abbreviation: UNCHR. Its purpose was the promotion and protection of human rights in its cooperation. On March 15, 2006, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to replace UNCHR with the UN Human Right Council

9. Defense to war over information
Ms.Gay-Macdugal had investigated the violence against women in Yugoslavia during wartime. And she made the report in August ,1998. The attached document mentions the comfort women problem again. She recommended Japanese Government accusing of the personnel in charge of the “rape center” and the users of it. She also recommended making compensations to former comfort women. Japanese Government however regards these as her personal opinions based on her wrecked ideas than official recommendations because UN Human Rights committee dose not deem a comfort house as a “rape center”.  August 2000, assemblies of the State of California also mistakenly resolved that they urge Japanese Government to make apologies to former comfort women in addition to the victims of coercive labor of prisoners in war and Nanking. {*23}  In addition, the book “Rape of Nanking” written by Iris Chang influenced quite match to passing of this bill. For publishing the book, Chang was strongly supported by Chinese American groups that Chinese government sponsored.

☆JOG(60) China’s diplomatic tactics in Nanking propaganda

The issues on “Nanking” and the “comfort women” share the same mechanism. Both were conspired to ruin the relationship between Japan and two countries. “Nanking” was set up by Chang’s book in the U.S. to bother Japan-U.S. alliance. The “comfort women” was plotted when Japan and South Korea started to setup friendship. This means blaming on the attitudes of the U.S. or South Korea against these issues without careful verification makes China’s conspiracy effective.

  Threatens that affect national security are not only weapons like missiles or spy ships. Information war is rather a new form of warfare we must recognize. Anti-Japanese forces inside and outside Japan are cooperating to launch such attacks continuously. It is essential to defend the country from propaganda by enemies to maintain country’s reputation and good relationship with other countries.

{*12}太子堂経慰 「慰安婦強制連行はなかった」  展転社 1999/2 204頁Tsuneyasu_Taishidou “There was no abduction of comfort women” Tendensha(Publisher) February, 1999 P,204
{*13}櫻井よしこ“密約外交の代償”「文塾春秋」平成9年4月号Sakurai_Yoshiko “Price of Secret Diplomacy ” Bungeishunju(Monthly periodical) April, 1997 issue
{*14}若手議員の会編 「歴史教科書への疑問」、日本の前途と歴史教育を考える 展転社 1997/12/23 314頁the meeting of junior lawmakers “Question to the History Textbook; Discuss Japanese outlook and the education of history”  Tendensha(Publisher)  December 23, 1997 P,314
{*15}「文芸春秋」 平成5年3月号Bungeishunju(Monthly periodical) March, 1993 issue
{*16}中嶋慎三郎 「日本人が捏造したインドネシア慰安婦」 祖国と青年 1996/12ASEAN center Shinzaburo_Nakajima ”Indonesian comfort women was forged by Japanese” Sokokutoseinensha (Organization paper) Nihonseinenkyougikai (Publisher) December, 1996
{*17}Heiho (兵補) = Supplementary soldiers who was recruited from indigenous people, mainly from Indonesia, in order to enhance and support Japanese military force in the battle of southern Asia (the Greater East Asia War)  Reference) [series of history of the war(senshisousho:戦史叢書) 102, the chronological charts of military and naval forces: attachment, explanation of military words and terms.
{*18}日本テレビ系列「NNNドキュメント’96」の96年9月29日、放送分From TV program”NNN Document 96″ broadcasted by NIPPON TELEVISION on September 29, 1996
{*19} This is the comments that Shinsaburo Nakajima who has been a close friend of chairman Ali directly heard from him. The comments come from “Indonesian comfort women who was made up by Japanese”
{*20}1996年11月14日、情報省ビル会議室の記者会見にてSummarized from press conference in the building of the Indonesian Ministry of Information in Nov 14, 1996 by Menteri Sosial Inten Suweno.
{*21} 吉見義明 「従軍慰安婦」 岩波新書 1995/4 103頁Yoshiaki_yoshimi “Comfort Women” iwanamishinsho(Publisher) April, 1995 P,103
{*22}秦郁彦 「慰安婦の戦場の性」 新潮選書 1999/6Ikuhiko_hata “Nature of Comfort Women in the Battle Filed” shinchousensho(Publisher) June,1999
{*23}産経新聞 1999/08/27 東京朝刊 4頁 国際2面Sankei(newspaper) August 27, 1999(Tokyo morning newspaper) P,4

Truth of Comfort Women-Verification(Non-translation)-
Truth of Comfort Women– plot – 
Other problems
Korea rule of Japan
The spread of Korean
support from Japan
  Controversies over the

of Japan-Korea

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