Study of English

December 13, 2007

“Nanking Massacre” / Documentary film “Nanking” part5 of 5

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“Nanking Massacre” 

 Documentary film “Nanking” part5 of 5


“Nanking Massacre” / Documentary film “Nanking” part4 of 5

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“Nanking Massacre” 

 Documentary film “Nanking” part4 of 5

“Nanking Massacre” / Documentary film “Nanking” part3 of 5

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“Nanking Massacre” 

 Documentary film “Nanking” part3 of 5

“Nanking Massacre” / Documentary film “Nanking” part1 of 5

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“Nanking Massacre” 

 Documentary film “Nanking” part2 of 5

“Nanking Massacre” / Documentary film “Nanking” part1 of 5

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“Nanking Massacre” 

 Documentary film “Nanking” part1 of 5

“Nanking Massacre” / “Nanking surrender” Asahi World News Extra & News flash

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“Nanking Massacre”

“Nanking surrender” Asahi World News Extra & News flash

December 12, 2007


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Higashinakano Shudo
Professor of Intellectual History
Asia University, Tokyo

In January 2003, official documents that demolish . once and for all . the “Nanking Massacre” myth were discovered. Marked “top-secret,” they were compiled in 1941 by the Chinese Nationalist Ministry of Information under the title Outline of International Propaganda operations. The documents are detailed records describing counterintelligence activities implemented by the Nationalists in 1937, when war with Japan broke out, and thereafter.

Nanking was the seat of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government in 1937. The documents are preserved in Taiwan, home to the Nationalists since 1949. The author discovered them at the Museum of Chinese Nationalist Party History in Taipei. He made photocopies of the documents, which he took back to Japan.

An examination of those documents reveals that the provenance of accusations that Japan perpetrated a massacre in Nanking is wartime propaganda initiated by the Nationalist intelligence organization. They also expose European and American Nationalist agents who were intimately involved in the concoction of “Nanking Massacre” propaganda.
One of them was the China correspondent for the Manchester Guardian, an Australian who went by the name of H. J. Timperley. At the time, Timperley was perceived as the conscientious journalist who told the world about the “Nanking Massacre.” What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China, a book that he edited, became the bible of proponents of the massacre. However, the top-secret documents unearthed in 2003 state, in no uncertain terms, that What War Means was part of the Chinese propaganda campaign against Japan.

In 1937, the Nationalist government’s International Propaganda Department made the decision to mount an external propaganda campaign involving foreign (European and American) collaborators. The use of foreign newspaper reporters as those collaborators was central to that campaign.

The International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone was organized mainly by Christian missionaries from the U.S.; its members were all foreigners residing in Nanking. We now know that the Committee’s leaders were closely connected with Timperley, and participated willingly in the propaganda campaign against Japan. War Damage in the Nanking Area, written by Lewis Smythe and M. S. Bates, was also a Chinese Nationalist propaganda tool designed for use against Japan.

Equally important, perhaps, is absence of any mention of a massacre’s having been perpetrated in Nanking in official Nationalist government proclamations issued between 1937 and 1945. In the aforementioned top-secret documents, no particular emphasis is given to Nanking in the year 1937, except for references to the launching of a propaganda war against Japan in connection with the fall of the Nationalist capital.

According to these same documents, between December 1937 (the time when the massacre is supposed to have been committed) and October 1938, the Nationalist government, now operating from Hankou, held a total of 300 press conferences to which members of the foreign press were invited (usually 50 of those journalists attended). However, there is no evidence showing that mention of a massacre in Nanking was made at any of those conferences. The government did issue a protest to the Assembly of the League of Nations soon after the Nanking Incident (the fall of Nanking). However, that protest was in connection with a minor bombing incident in Hankou.

Even more interesting are the circumstances surrounding the Chinese translation of What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China, the aforementioned propaganda book issued by the International Propaganda Department. Outline of International Propaganda Operations tells us that portions of the book suggesting that there had been a massacre in Nanking were deleted from that translation. The International Propaganda Department had apparently deemed those sections inappropriate because they lacked credibility and might be counterproductive. This decision implies that the Nationalist propaganda machine had determined that the dissemination of propaganda ― even in wartime ― relating to a massacre in Nanking was unseemly.

Proponents of the “Nanking Massacre” have been mystified for decades by the absence of
references to a massacre in the writings of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, and in reports and other documents relating to the Battle of Nanking issued by the Nationalist government. Outline of International Propaganda Operations has solved the mystery, once and for all.

War Damage in the Nanking Area

December 8, 2007

Canada joined the group ” C’s ” (China and Corea). Congratulations.

Canada’s parliament passed a motion this week calling on Japan to apologize to the brothel prostitutes that served for the benefit of the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II.
Congratulations, you Canadians.
You joined the group ” C’s ” (China and Corea) of the glory. Please get along well with them.

December 3, 2007

Japan That Helped the Jewish Refugees. By Uesugi Chitoshi (Summary)

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Japan That Helped the Jewish Refugees
By Uesugi Chitoshi


I was devoting myself to a study of history textbooks when I encountered a high-school text called “New English Course” (Sanyûsha), which came into use in April of 1994. One passage introduced the account of Sugihara Chiune, a Japanese vice-consul in Kaunas, Lithuania, who issued some 2,000 visas to save about 6,000 Jewish refugees in the summer of 1940.
I learned about this mention of Sugihara in the textbook from media reports.
I felt that there was something difficult to understand in the account.
Since Sugihara and I were from the same prefecture, I set out to investigate
the circumstances at the time of the issuance of those visas.
As a result, I found that it hadn’t been only Sugihara who had been helping Jewish refugees. At the outbreak of the Sino–Japanese Incident in June of 1937, when Japan couldn’t avoid getting involved in the problem of
the Jewish refugees, the examples of high-ranking military officers like Maj. Gen. Higuchi Kiichirô, Col. Yasue Norihiro, and naval Capt. Inuzuka Koreshige, serve to demonstrate the proactive stance of the Japanese armed forces to deal compassionately with Jewish refugees.
Thanks to those connected with these four men, a biographical and historical record now exists of their actions. Since no account setting forth the general situations of these men’s actions exists, it is difficult to get to know the full story.
It from my research that I came to realize these four men’s personal stories and their admirable actions — like those of Inuzuka, who carried out a difficult duty in Shanghai — have been completely misunderstood.
I was able to write Yudaya Nanmin to Hakkô Itchô (Jewish Refugees and Universal Brotherhood* — published on 2/11/2002 by Tentensha) using documents of the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the nucleus, supported by exchanges of shared information and materials provided by Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Higuchi’s eldest daughter, Tamamura Michiko (born 12/18/1917); the husband of his third daughter Hashimoto Fujiko (b. 7/13/1929), Hashimoto Yoshikata; his fourth daughter, Satô Chieko (b. 9/3/1933); Col. Yasue’s eldest son, Yasue Hiroo (b. 7/6/1924); and Capt.
Inuzuka’s eldest son, Inuzuka Masataka (b. 12/15/1932).
Inuzuka Masakata (graduate in English literature from the Department of Letters of Tokyo Kyôiku University, formerly an English teacher at a public high school in Shizuoka prefecture) took on the task of translating this book into English. The title has been changed for that edition to The Japan that Helped Jewish Refugees.
With this English publication, the book can be read widely in Europe, America, and Israel.
Yudaya Nanmin to Hakkô Itchô is not a book for the masses; its writing style is formal and essay-like, and not even easy to read in Japanese.
Now, however, with publication in English, it is all the more available.
There are a few points that need to be noted about the actions of these four people.

* The phrase “hakkô itchô” has been variously translated as
“the eight corners of the world under one roof,” “Universal Brotherhood,” etc. Since “Universal Brotherhood” was the official translation used during the Tokyo Tribunals, we have adopted that usage here.

A. “The Higuchi–Matsuoka Route”: Rescuing the Jewish Refugees With the outbreak of the Sino–Japanese Incident, the Central Army grew concerned about Soviet activities, so Maj. Gen. Higuchi was recalled from Berlin where he had arrived to serve as military attaché at the Japanese embassy. He was assigned as chief of the Special Service Agency at Harbin in Manchuria (formerly the three north-east provinces of China).
At that time, Dr. A. Kaufmann, leader of the Jewish community in Harbin, was planning for a Far-East Asian Jewish Conference. There was concern when Gen. Higuchi arrived at his post, but he reassured them when he showed his approval for holding the conference.
The army’s central department, which knew of this through the Kwantung Army, sent the army’s number-one expert on Jewish studies —Col. Yasue Norihiro, who had been a student at the military academy at the same time as Higuchi — to assist him.
The First Far-East Asian Jewish Conference was opened in Harbin on Dec. 26, 1937 and lasted for three days. It was a success. This paved the way for the Second Conference to be held in December of 1938, and the Third in December of 1939.
On March 8, 1938, news arrived of Jewish refugees arriving at Otopol Station in the Soviet Union. Higuchi dvised a Japanese diplomat in Harbin, Manchuria, named Shimomura Nobusada, to help them gain passage.
Thereupon, Shimomura telephoned the director of the South Manchurian Railroad, Matsuoka Yôsuke (later Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs), and asked him to arrange a train.
Matsuoka issued directions to give free passage to the refugees.
Thereafter, free passage to the refugees was made a standing policy.
Because of the resolute actions of Higuchi and Matsuoka, many Jewish refugees were admitted to Harbin and Dalian, and then went on to America or Shanghai. I call this the Higuchi–Matsuoka Route.
Nazi Germany issued a protest over the Otopol Incident, but the chiefof-staff of the Kwantung Army, Lt. Gen. (later Prime Minister) Tôjô Hideki, was in agreement with Gen. Higuchi, so he ignored it. When he wrote his memoirs after the war, Higuchi praised Tôjô’s stance highly.

B. “The Yasue-Itagaki Line”: A National Policy to Protect the Jewish Refugees.
Col. Yasue, after having the opportunity to participate in the First Far-East Asian Jewish Conference, took a hand in dealing with the problem of Jewish refugees while part of the Kwantung Army.
Yasue had the idea of adding the Jews to the Manchurian national policy of “Peaceful Cooperation Among the Five Peoples” to make it “Peaceful Cooperation Among the Six Peoples.” On Jan. 21, 1938, he had the Kwantung Army headquarters declare “An Outline on the Policy Vis-à-vis the Jewish People Henceforth.”
This was meant to include the Jewish people in the stated goal to “make [our] ideal to gather in the embrace of our great spirit of Universal Brotherhood.”
There were ideas among those in the economic world to use Jewish capital in the development of Manchuria. In opposition to this, he stated, “We must strictly stave off attitudes like arbitrarily making investments with Jewish capital.”
Then, in July of 1938, delegates from 32 nations met at an international conference in Evian, France and issued a flat rebuff to the
question of accepting Jewish refugees. With this, a large influx of refugees was anticipated only for countries in the Japanese sphere of influence. On Oct. 3, 1938, Japan decided that “[they] are not wanted in Japan or any of our colonies (but they may pass through them).”
Yasue, in opposition to this policy of the Foreign Affairs Office, sent a petition to the Minister of the Army Lt. Gen. (later Gen.) Itagaki Seishirô, with a letter of introduction from Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Ishihara Kanji, the deputy chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, who had been a classmate at the military academy. As a result, at a proposal from the Minister of the Army, key ministers of state (called a “Conference of Five Ministers”) met on Dec. 6, 1938, and in concert decided on a “Policy Prospectus Vis-à-vis the Jews.”
The policy said, “Now, for Jewish people coming legally into Japan, Manchuria, or China, conventional regulations for foreign immigrants are dispensed with.” The protection of Jewish refugees had become a state policy.
In its preamble, it stated “[We are] in agreement with the timehonored assertion of the spirit of equality for all people” — a distinct denial of the anti-Semitic polity of Japan’s ally, Nazi Germany.
In this fashion, protection of Jewish refugees was made a Japanese national policy thanks to the “Yasue–Itagaki Line.”

C. “Paradise” — The Jewish Refugee Community in Shangai and the Inuzuka Machine
With the Sino–Japanese Incident, the Jewish quarter of Shanghai became one of the districts under the protection of the Japanese navy. The Japanese navy’s number one expert on Jewish studies was Capt. Inuzuka Koreshige, who was serving at the Naval Headquarters. After suggesting setting up the conference in Shanghai to discuss the policy of what to do with the Jews, he felt it had become necessary for him to remain full-time in Shanghai, so in April of 1939, the “Inuzuka Machine” was born.
He’d heard unofficial word of a promotion to rear admiral and an assignment to sea duty, but instead he requested a transfer to the reserves and an assignment with the navy in Shanghai so that he could function from time to time as the head of the Inuzuka Machine.
At that time, there was anti-Semitic sentiment spreading in Japan from when Japan sent troops into Siberia. When one faction connected with the army in Shanghai issued an opinion piece suggesting that the Jews should be deported, Inuzuka issued a piece countering that position to the army there on March 19, 1939. In it, he said, “These refugees are German citizens and in a third [i.e., someone else’s] country. Where might the authority to deport them be under international law?” With this, he quashed
the talk of deportation.
The unrestricted influx of refugees was causing problems for the Shanghai Jewish community and Shanghai’s department of works. A request was made to Inuzuka to enlist the Japanese government’s help in stopping the incoming flow of refugees.
Instead, he found himself in a troubling position, unable to stave the refugee influx and still having to do whatever he could for them. Among the refugees arriving in Kobe were some who knew nothing of these circumstances, and who thought Inuzuka was in agreement with the Nazi’s diabolical “Final Solution to the Jewish Problem.”
The truth was that on June 10, 1939, Inuzuka allowed the investigation section of Manchurian Rail to publish his report declaring that Protocols of the Elders of Zion was the greatest literary hoax of the century.
The beliefs of those in favor of stopping the influx of refugees to Shanghai were therefore a spectacular misconception.
Inuzuka returned to his original position upon the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War. On Dec. 30, 1941, the Shanghai Naval Office Special Investigative Unit was established and he became its head. The unit’s purpose was to investigate the Sassoon financial empire and conduct counterespionage.
One of their jobs which must be noted here was one in which they investigated the relationship between the Jews and the Freemasons, for which inquiry they entered the temple to bring light onto the subject.
According to their report, “An Outline of the Investigation of the Freemasons,” Nazi propaganda claiming the Freemasons to be a group secretly controlled by Jews was not correct.
About this time, a false story accusing Inuzuka of misappropriation of funds from the Sassoon financial empire began to be spread by anti-Semitic powers in the employ of the army and others. The naval authorities were unable to cope with this complication, so Inuzuka was ordered to sea. When he shipped off on March 7, 1942, he was seen off by an assemblage of notable Jewish personages.
Capt. Inuzuka had turned down a promotion and volunteered to work in Shanghai to solve the complicated problem of the Jewish refugees. In 1991, Hilda Rabau, a poet who had experienced life in Shanghai then, wrote a poem called “Shanghai Was Paradise.”

D. “Visas of Life” — Sugihara Issued Visas Against Orders from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was Awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Fifth Class.
Sugihara Chiune took up his post as vice-consul in Kaunas, Lithuania, at the establishment of the consulate there in August of 1939. His duty was to collect international information.
Early on July 18, 1940, many Jewish refugees appeared at the consulate seeking visas. Because of this, Sugihara sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a telegram, and they responded. The specifics of the exchange was published on March 30, 1996, by Shiraishi Masaaki of the Ministry Archives in “Introducing Documents: On Records Regarding the Issuance of the So-called Visas of Life” (Reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, vol. 8).
According to the article, the core of his instructions was to issue visas to those who “carry suitable [amounts] of money for travel expenses as well as for their stay in-country, after completing procedures for them to go on to their destination country.” There was nothing in them to say that he was to be particularly strict just because they were Jewish refugees.
If he had followed the directives, he would not have been able to issue any visas, however. Therefore, from July 29 to Aug. 26 he rubber-stamped a large number of visas for the Dutch-held island of Curaçao. The total number of visas issued was 2,139. These were family visas that were issued, however, and if we take each visa covering three people, this means a total of some
6,000 people.
The Jewish refugees went by ship from Vladivostok to Tsuruga and were welcomed in by the Jewish community in Kobe. Thereafter, they sailed on to America or Australia, or went to Shanghai.
Thus, he issued these “visas of life” in full readiness to resign his position; but the powers that be of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Minister Matsuoka Yôsuke and Deputy Minister Ôhashi Chûichi — imposed no penalties on him whatsoever. With the signing of the Tripartite Agreement on Sept. 27, 1940, there was concern among the Jews living in Tokyo. To Jikkman, who had been introduced to him by Capt. Yasue, Matsuoka said that, “though I was responsible for the alliance with Hitler, I said nothing about carrying out anti-Semitic activities in Japan. This is not a personal opinion; it is also the opinion of the Japanese government.” Moreover, Ôhashi was from Gifu Prefecture, as was Sugihara, and they both had worked as diplomats with Manchurian Rail, and Ôhashi had the highest regard for Sugihara, who had exhibited supreme skill with the problematic purchase of
the Manchurian Rail line from the Soviet Union.
Thus, Sugihara continued to work as a diplomat in Europe, and on Nov.
15, 1944, he was awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure, fifth-class.
He returned to Japan after the war in 1947. On June 7, he resigned from the foreign service. This was due to the Administrative Reorganization and Special Staffing Order of 1946, calling for a shake-up in personnel. This was not a dismissal and it had nothing whatsoever to do with the issuance of the “visas of life.”
The Jewish community holds in high regard the afore-mentioned people who helped the Jewish refugees. The “Golden Book” (as it is commonly known in Japan) is the registry of the names of those being highly honored.
On June 14, 1941, Maj. Gen. Higuchi’s name was entered in volume six as number 4026, and entry number 4028 was Col. Yasue’s. Capt. Inuzuka declined the honor, saying, “I was only working in accordance with the Emperor’s benevolence toward all people.” On Jan. 18, 1985, Vice-consul Sugihara was awarded the status of “Righteous Among the Nations” by the government of Israel.
There are few, however, who know what a humane act was made by Itagaki Shôshirô when, As Minister of the Army, he set forth the “Policy Prospectus Vis-à-vis the Jews” on Dec. 6, 1938. Given the global perspective at the time, it was a most meritorious deed. I advocate making Dec. 6 “Humanity Day.”
The establishment of the “Higuchi-Matsuoka Route” was made possible through the appropriate decision of Lt. Gen. Tôjô Hideki, chief-ofstaff of the Kwantung Army. Furthermore, Matsuoka Yôsuke didn’t only help with the passage of the Jewish refugees while chairman of the South Manchurian Railroad — as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, he didn’t punish Vice-consul Sugihara for arguably disobeying his directives. Still more, even though he entered into a pact and allied with Nazi Germany, his declaration to the Jewish community makes it is clear that he didn’t agree with Hitler’s anti-Semitic policies. Those whose words and deeds are such as these are deserving of high praise.
There were probably many in Japan after the war who just couldn’t understand how these people could have behaved in such a pro-Jewish way while the prevailing trend in the world was anti-Semitic. I doubt that even many Jews or the rest of the world understands, either.
The Japanese thought that the Jews were a threat to Japan, thanks to the anti-Semitic propaganda picked up from White Russians following the sending of troops into Siberia during the First World War — propaganda about the emergence of Communism in Russia and the machinations of Jews in Europe. Because of this concern, Yasue and Inuzuka took up Jewish studies, becoming the army and navy’s top experts on the subject. This is why they became the people responsible for the Jews — Yasue in Manchuria, and
Inuzuka in Shanghai.
It wasn’t just those two, however. Many people of the time (especially military men) thought of the words of the founding emperor, Jinmu, after creating the state of Japan: “Universal Brotherhood.” This great principle was behind all thought and conduct.
This is why, when dealing deliberately with the Jews who were in crisis at the time, it was only natural that they did so according to “Universal Brotherhood” rather than being concerned about “the Jewish peril.” Sugihara was probably thinking about this when he said, “As I was confronted by these wailing Jewish refugees, what I thought was, ‘what would His Majesty do if he were here?’ When I thought that, the conclusion was obvious. I had to do what I thought His Majesty would have done.”
On Dec. 15, 1945, the American Army, occupying Japan, ordered the exclusion of the phrase “Universal Brotherhood” as a government slogan as one part of the “Shinto Directive” to tear down the Japanese spirit. At the Tokyo Tribunal (AKA Far-East Military Tribunal), however, the incarcerated former Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichirô and former Army Minister Araki Sadao, made a petition, pleading through attorney Kiyose Ichirô and others that “Universal Brotherhood” was a moral objective — a principle expressing the universality of man — and nothing more. It was a phrase that had nothing to do with any expression of aggression.
As an ally of Nazi Germany, Japan cooperated militarily and diplomatically, but definitely not with the idea of anti-Semitism. The
Japanese firmly believed, and acted on, the spirit behind the ideal of the founding of the Japanese state of “Universal Brotherhood” — that is, the acceptance of Imperial will and acting in accord with it was the active principal of the Japanese people.

Profile: Uesugi Chitoshi
Mr. Uesugi was born the third son of a Shinto priest in the city of Hida in Gifu Prefecture in 1927. After graduating from Kokugakuin University with a degree in history, he worked for 37 years as a high school social studies teacher. He retired in 1988. From the time he was a high school teacher, he was attached to the Japanese Teachers’ Association, an educational study organization, and undertook various studies and carried out awareness programs to correct left-wing educational tendencies.
In particular, he undertook the responsibility of laboring for the alteration of the Japanese Education Act, publishing Discourses on Amending the Japanese Education Act (Japanese Teachers’ Library) in 1980, and Points of Contention with the Japanese Education Act (Yoshimoto Co.) in 1984. In addition, he wrote a six-part series called “Dear Hiroshima Board of Education” in the magazine Seiron, starting in September of 1997, raising questions about criticism of Japan’s national flag and anthem in the educational milieu. The series received considerable feedback and created something of a
controversy, and served as an impetus to the establishment in 2002 of the National Flag and Anthem Law. He published The “Hinomaru” and “Kimigayo” Seen as Our Supreme Embodiment: the World’s National Flags and Anthems (Japanese Law and Culture Studies Center) in 1991 concerning the problem.
He has written many other works primarily concentrating on historical problems.
Important works among them are Verifying the “Comfort Women” (Zenbô Co.) in 1993, The Whole Story of the Comfort Women Problem (Kokumin Kaikan Library) in 1994, Recapping the School Textbook Controversy and Educational Judgement (Yoshimoto Co.) in 1990, The Great East Asia War as a War of Conflicting Cultures (Zenbô Co.) in
1995, and Jewish Refugees and The Whole World Under One Roof (Tenden Co.) in 2002.

September 26, 2007

Open Questions for Prime Minister Wen Jiabao: Can You Prove There Was a Massacre in Nanking?

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Moteki Hiromichi
Committee for the Examination of the Facts about Nanking

PRC Prime Minister Wen Jiabao arrived in Japan on April 11, 2007. In his April 12 address to the Diet, Japan’s parliament, Wen said that he had undertaken this visit in the hope that it would ease tension between China and Japan. But no sooner had those words left his mouth when he launched into the sort of lie that we’ve come to expect: “Japan’s aggression caused great sufferings and tremendous human and economic losses to the Chinese people.”1

The CCP (Chinese Communist Party) bears the ultimate responsibility for the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The conflict was triggered by a communist plot, which involved arranging for Chinese troops to fire on Japanese soldiers in the Marco Polo (Lugou) Bridge Incident. The Comintern then issued orders to the Chinese Communists as follows:

1. Do all possible to obstruct a local resolution of the incident; it is imperative to bring about full-scale hostilities between Japan and China.
2. Use any and every means available to accomplish objective stated in 1; we authorize the elimination of any person in a position of leadership who would betray the movement to liberate China by advocating a local resolution or making concessions to the Japanese.2

Moreover, the Communists repeatedly violated a formal truce.

Today we have access to reliable resources that substantiate this assertion. Nevertheless, the Chinese still have the effrontery to insist that Japan waged an aggressive war. Even more disheartening was the sight of Japan’s Diet representatives nodding their heads in agreement with Wen, and even applauding his speech.

But perhaps the biggest lie of all is the allegation that the Japanese perpetrated a massacre in Nanking, which the Chinese continue to make. They have even built a shrine in Nanking dedicated to the memory of the victims of a massacre that never was. More than a few Japanese are angered by representatives of the PRC who spout platitudes about Japan-China friendship in one breath, and in the next utter vile propaganda of this sort.

We wished to benefit from the opportunity of Prime Minister Wen’s visit to Japan. We wanted to tell him that his government’s schizophrenic stance on Japan is absurd, especially since recent scholarly research proves beyond the shadow of a doubt that there was no “Nanking massacre.” We wanted to ask the prime minister what his thoughts are about this problem. To that end, we prepared a document that contains our queries in the form of open questions, with some background information.

How will Wen Jiabao respond?

We expect that 2007, marking the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Nanking as it does, will be a critical year. Reports have it that at least 10 films relating to the incident are in the offing. A myth that has already been given far too much credence threatens to become imprinted on the global memory for all time. To combat these lies, Mizushima Satoru, president of Channel Sakura, has begun a fund-raising campaign for a film to be produced this year under the (provisional) title The Truth About Nanking. It will be a documentary that exposes the lies that have been disseminated over the years.

In connection with this campaign, we formed the Committee for the Examination of the Facts about Nanking, on March 13 of this year. The committee is an organization dedicated to communicating the facts about 1937 Nanking, rationally and comprehensively, to the public, both at home and abroad. Our chairman is Kase Hideaki, who is assisted by Secretary Fujioka Nobukatsu and 13 other members. This writer is honored to be one of them.

On April 9, our open questions, translated into Chinese, were delivered to Prime Minister Wen in care of the Chinese Embassy. On the same day, we distributed the document (in English and Japanese, in addition to Chinese) to leading media companies, along with a press release. We sent the same package to each of the 80 members of the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan.

We have already received several requests for interviews from representatives of overseas media organizations. From Wen Jiabao, however, we have heard not a thing. We are not surprised. After all, it would be impossible to defend a proposition built on lies, as the “Nanking massacre” was.

Then, will the prime minister admit that the accusations relating to Nanking were made in error? We don’t think so. Even if his conscience told him to do the right thing, he could not utter words that might tear the fabric of the communist regime to shreds.

That being the case, Wen Jiabao will probably opt to remain silent. Still, these are open questions. The entire world knows that they have been submitted to the Chinese prime minister. If he ignores them, everyone will know that the PRC government is dishonest and rude, and that its silence proves that the “Nanking massacre” was fabricated.

The document submitted to the prime minister, which follows this article, consisted of five questions and one request. Here, we would like to offer some commentary for each question.

1. No mention of “Nanking massacre” by Mao Zedong

In this question, we refer to the fact that Mao Zedong never alluded to a massacre in Nanking, not in any of his writings or his correspondence. In Mao: The Unknown Story, author Jung Chang berates the Chinese leader posthumously for failing to mention the “Nanking massacre.”3
Mao is an estimable work in that it contains 500 interviews and often draws on valuable information gleaned from declassified Soviet documents. But as far as Japan is concerned, the author is stuck in the old, stale “aggressor nation” mindset.

Mao Zedong did not fail to mention a massacre in Nanking because he was out of touch with current events. Even when the Communist Party fled to Yan’an, its underground network encompassed all of China. Since the Battle of Nanking was fought during the Second United Front, Mao would have been well informed about events in Nanking, the capital. In fact, he wrote his observations about the Battle of Nanking in On Protracted War: “Japanese troops surrounded many, but killed few” (the Japanese generally freed prisoners of war).

It is the height of foolishness to assume that Mao Zedong would have neglected to speak out if Nanking had actually been the scene of the massacre of the century.

2. 300 press conferences

Prof. Higashinakano Shudo discovered vital information at the Museum of Chinese Nationalist Party History in Taipei, in a document entitled Outline of Operations: International Propaganda Department, Central Propaganda Office. For details, see his Understanding the Nanking Incident with the Aid of Top-Secret Nationalist Documents.4

The document states that 300 press conferences were held in Hankou between December 1, 1937 and October 20, 1938. On average, they were attended by 50-60 people, 35 of whom were members of the foreign press and embassy personnel. Not one of those 300 press conferences held over a 10-month period that straddled the Battle of Nanking was devoted to, entirely or in part, descriptions of Japanese troops murdering civilians or killing prisoners of war unlawfully. Nor did a foreign journalist even once pose a question about the “Nanking massacre.”

If there had indeed been a massacre in Nanking, what is the likelihood of press conferences sponsored by the International Propaganda Office skirting the subject? Could the International Propaganda Office have been so extraordinarily incompetent as to be ignorant of events that transpired in Nanking? Not if one is to believe the accounts in John Rabe’s The Good Man of Nanking that mention a large number of officers (among them Long, Zhou, Han and Luo), who were hiding in the Safety Zone, where they engaged in covert activities.

Moreover, Miner Searle Bates, a Nanking University professor who was also an advisor to the Nationalist government (and a member of the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone) was only one of the foreign residents of the city who collaborated with the Nationalists. They would certainly have been prolific communicators of information about a massacre.

The reason for not referring to the “Nanking massacre” at the aforementioned press conferences is simple: no information about such a catastrophe had been received. The International Propaganda Office had no choice but to manufacture the catastrophe, selecting as its accomplice Harold Timperley, a newspaper reporter (an inspired choice, since journalists are assumed to be neutral) as a secret agent. Timperley was hired to produce What War Means: The Japanese Terror in China, a propaganda book intended for foreign consumption. The aforementioned top-secret document attests to the fact that the book was, in its entirety, a product of the Chinese propaganda machine.

Apparently, Timperley spent a great deal of his career acting as the henchman of conspirators. He later became the head of Trans-Pacific News Service, a news agency based in the U.S., which also pretended to be neutral.

3. Nanking’s population increases

One would expect a decrease in population in the aftermath of a massacre. However, Documents of the Nanking Safety Zone (hereafter DNSZ) paints a different picture. DNSZ is a logbook describing the International Committee’s activities, issued by Shanghai publisher Kelly & Walsh in 1939 under the supervision of the Chinese government. Therefore, it would have toed the Nationalist Party line.

For the population prior to the fall of Nanking, DNSZ relies on Wang Gupan, head of the National Police Agency. Wang reported a population of 200,000, which according to DNSZ, remained unchanged throughout December 1937.

It would be impossible to take a census during the upheaval of war. But there are statistics for December 1937, and they were recorded by the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone. (It was the International Committee that saw to the needs of the Nanking’s residents, who had gathered in the Safety Zone, after the city’s government officials had fled.)

The committee members continued to record the population as 200,000 even after the city fell. But the story doesn’t end there. According to DNSZ, by January 14, 1938, a month into the Japanese occupation, Nanking’s population had expanded to 250,000.

The Japanese military, aided by the Self-Government Committee, had been issuing civilian passports in connection with efforts to track down Chinese military personnel hiding in the Safety Zone. During this process, it became clear that there were many more people in Nanking than originally estimated. Consequently, the International Committee made an upward revision to 250,000.

If there had been a massacre in Nanking, the population would have decreased. It did not decrease. If it had, the International Committee would certainly not have recorded an increase.
We would appreciate Wen Jiabao’s attempt to explain away that increase, which appears in DNSZ, a publication supervised by the Nationalist government. We imagine that here, too, he will maintain silence.

He could, like Iris Chang, superimpose fiction on fiction by first manufacturing a population of 300,000 outside the Safety Zone and then claiming that it was obliterated in a massacre. In fact, that would seem to be his only option.

4. 26 murder cases

Many people may believe that there was wholesale slaughter in Nanking, even though there may not have been enough victims to cause a population decrease. We know that there were not sufficient murder cases to justify the International Propaganda Department’s breathing a hint of a massacre at even one press conference. To that information we can add the fact that only 26 murders are recorded in DNSZ.
The Safety Zone was established in an area of Nanking 3.9 square kilometers in area (less than 40% of the size of Chuo Ward, Tokyo Prefecture’s smallest administrative district or less than Central Park in Manhattan). Since 200,000 refugees crowded into that small space, it would have been nearly impossible to commit a violent crime and escape the scrutiny of 400,000 eyes.

With very few exceptions, Japanese military personnel were not permitted to leave their barracks at night. Chinese troops who had taken refuge in the Safety Zone ruled the streets at night. Japanese soldiers with criminal intent would have had to exercise it in broad daylight, when there surely would have been witnesses.

The International Committee received numerous complaints from Chinese. Committee members were unable to investigate all of them, but they did type up a report for every complaint received. The reports were compiled into “Cases of Disorder”, a section of DNSZ. Some of the cases reported by Chinese strain credibility, or at least seem suspicious.

An analysis of every case listed in DNSZ yields only 26 murders. Only one murder was witnessed; it involved the lawful killing of a soldier who tried to escape when stopped for questioning. Therefore, this case cannot be considered a crime.

The remaining 25 allegations of murder lack witnesses, or are based on hearsay. Normally, the presence of a corpse tells us that a murder has been committed. Only in three of the cases is a corpse mentioned, and in those cases, there was no evidence that would implicate Japanese military personnel. So much for the murder cases described in a book produced under the supervision of a Chinese Nationalist government organization.

At the Tokyo Trials, Tsukamoto Koji, who had been judge advocate of the Shanghai Expeditionary Forces, testified that between December 1937 and February 1938 he had handled two or three murder cases. The military police referred all crimes committed by Japanese soldiers to Tsukamoto.

His testimony is largely in agreement with the case records in DNSZ, especially when one takes into consideration the fact that a body was present at the crime scene in only three of the 25 alleged murders. Therefore, there cannot have been even 10 murders.

The Chinese government may counter this question with what they claim are the testimonies of massacre victims. But if they are not consistent with contemporary records, they are not worthy of discussion. Such testimonies, especially those that run counter to information provided in Questions 2, 3 and 4, should not be accepted as fact.

5. No photographic proof of a massacre

Our fifth question relates to photographs used as evidence in Iris Chang’s book and in many other works that purportedly expose the “Nanking massacre.” The Massacre Memorial Museum in Nanking, along with other “history museums” in China displays photographs they would have us believe bear witness to a massacre.
However, Analyzing the “Photographic Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre addresses those photographs. The authors analyzed 143 photographs that appear frequently in books and museums, applying the strictest scientific standards. Their conclusion: not one of them attests to a massacre in Nanking.5

Most of the photographs made their first appearances (in connection with the “Nanking massacre,” that is) in Record of Atrocities Committed by the Japanese Enemy, issued by the Nationalist government’s International Propaganda Department in July 1938, and Japanese Atrocities Witnessed by Foreigners (the Chinese version of Timperley’s What War Means). They later made their way into other publications. Some of them were distributed to the Trans-Pacific News Service (headed by the aforementioned Timperley) as news releases, and even reputable agencies like the AP (Associated Press) used them.

One of them is advertised as showing a Japanese officer engaged in sword practice on a prisoner of war tied to a cross. The Japanese government lodged a protest with the AP. The agency insisted that the photograph was authentic, but eventually was forced to back down. The story of this particular photograph is told in the January 1939 issue of The Lowdown, an American magazine.

The history of that one picture is interesting, in that it throws light on the history of most such pictures. It was first placed on sale, as a post card, in Shanghai in 1919. At that time it was presented as propaganda against one of the war lords who was ravaging an interior province. A year or so later it was brought out again depicting Communist Chinese officers torturing a Chinese prisoner of one of the northern provinces. It did not rest for long, as it was soon hauled out again as propaganda against the Japanese when they went into Manchuria. When the Manchurian crisis had ceased to be news it was put away only to be unearthed again to illustrate the atrocities committed by the Chinese Soviets when Chiang Kai-shek was attempting to wipe out the Chinese Red Army in 1934.

In its most recent appearance it was used for the customary purpose of enlisting American sympathies ? arousing anti-Japanese sentiment in this country.6

As incredible as it may seem, this same photograph, which was discredited prior to World War II, has been exhumed and now serves as evidence of the “Nanking massacre.”

One of the photographs in Chang’s book shows corpses floating near the banks of the Yangtze River. It turns out to have been taken by former Japanese Army soldier Murase Moriyasu, so its provenance is not in question. The 11th Company, 45th Regiment had been engaged in a bitter battle near Xinhezhen. Some of the defeated Chinese jumped into the river, and their bodies were carried by the current to the site where the photograph was taken. Obviously, this photograph has nothing to do with a massacre.

Murase reported that the city of Nanking was, for some reason, declared off-limits to his company (a transport unit) for two weeks. He is of the opinion that military authorities kept them out of the city so they wouldn’t see the massacre. This is a case of woeful ignorance. At that time, 130 journalists were combing the city for stories and shooting roll after roll of film. And in fact, no one came forward after World War II, claiming to have taken photographs of the “massacre.”

In our open questions, we invite anyone in China with photographic evidence of the “Nanking massacre” to produce it, but we are not expecting any response. The North Koreans sent human ashes to Japan, claiming they belonged to the abducted Yokota Megumi. DNA testing revealed that they did not. But the Chinese are not so foolish as to claim faked photographs are genuine.
Close the Massacre Memorial Museum

We believe that the Chinese will be unable to respond to any of our five questions. With good reason: there never was a massacre in Nanking.

We will not insist that China respond directly to our questions. But if the PRC government truly desires amicable relations with Japan, it must shut down an institution that unjustly speaks evil of Japan and perpetuates a myth: the Massacre Memorial Museum.

How can China promote friendship with Japan, and at the same time vilify Japan in the worst way possible? Such behavior is bound to have an extremely adverse impression on not only the Japanese, but on visitors who gather in China for the Olympic Games next year.

It is difficult to believe that China is serious about designating the Massacre Memorial Museum as a World Heritage site; doing so would be a grave mistake, and nothing short of self-destructive. We have more than enough evidence to convince the world that the “Nanking massacre” was a huge lie. Stating otherwise would be only adding another strand to the web of lies already spun.

1 People’s Daily Online, 12 April 2007.
2 Political Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Asian Development, Basic Materials about the Comintern and the Soviet Union’s China Policy (Tokyo: Political Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Asian Development, 1939).
3 Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), p. 207.
4 Higashinakano, Shudo, Nankin jiken: kokuminto gokuhi bunsho kara yomitoku (Understanding the Nanking Incident with the aid of top-secret Nationalist documents (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2006).
5 Higashinakano, Shudo, Kobayashi Susumu and Fukunaga Shinjiro, Nankin jiken: “shoko shashin” wo kensho suru (Analyzing the “Photographic Evidence” of the Nanking Massacre) (Tokyo: Soshisha, 2005).
6 “Words Breed War ”(by Joseph Hilton Smyth) in The Lowdown (New York, January 1939), p.19. 

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